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Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences
BRIAN M. MURRAY
This Article applies retributivist principles to discussions about collateral
consequences reform. Retributivist ideas relating to agency and responsibility,
proportionality, personal and communal restoration, and the obligations and duties
of the state, as well as the broader community, suggest suspicion of an expansive
collateral consequences regime. A retributivist assessment, cognizant of realities
within the criminal system, reveals that many are overly punitive and disruptive of
social order. Legislatures that prioritize retribution as a justification for and
constraint on punishment should think clearly about whether existing collateral
consequences result in disproportionate suffering and, if so, reconsider them. This
includes the outsourcing of punishment to private actors. Committed retributivist
decision makers within the system, such as line prosecutors, should consider how to
approach the imposition of collateral consequences when acting during various
phases of a prosecution. Finally, retributivist constraints can inform whether the
maintenance of criminal records by the state is justified, and for how long, as well
as the scope of second-chance remedies like expungement. These limitations could
allow for robust procedural protections for petitioners for relief, shifting the burden
of persuasion to the state. In short, retributive principles can be a useful tool for
reform, helping to restore to ex-offenders what they deserve.
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Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences
BRIAN M. MURRAY *
INTRODUCTION
1

When Jasmine Long finally finished her probation and paid all of her
fines and fees to the Philadelphia court system, she figured her experience
with the criminal justice system was over. It had been a nightmare. Monthly
meetings with her probation officer, extensive drug testing, and the constant
feeling that someone—or something—was always watching kept her awake
at night.2 She had adjusted to the disruptions to her family life, as difficult
as they were. While she had lost her job at the time of her arrest and managed
to survive an eviction3 given the hospitality of family and friends, she was
hopeful that not having to call out of work to go to the Criminal Justice
Center as part of probation would help her find a new job. She was wrong
on all counts.
*
Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to thank The Hon.
Stephanos Bibas, Youngjae Lee, Rick Garnett, Dave Hoffman, John Kip Cornwell, Margaret Lewis,
Amanda Bergold, Rick Greenstein, Ed Hartnett, Thomas Healy, John Stinneford, Joshua Kleinfeld, Alice
Ristroph, and Charlie Sullivan for feedback on this project. Thank you to participants at the Law and
Society Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., the Junior Scholars Colloquium hosted by the Federalist
Society in Annapolis, MD, CrimFest 2019 at Brooklyn Law School, and the Summer Workshop Series
at Seton Hall Law School for feedback on the larger project associated with this Article. I would also
like to thank my wife, Katherine, for her steadfast support and joy, and my children, Elizabeth, Eleanor,
George, and John, for their inspiring curiosity, endless questions, unyielding sense of wonder, and love
for life.
1
The following account is a fictional scenario based on the Author’s experience as a practicing
attorney in both the criminal defense and employment law contexts. The plight of the ex-offender is all
too common. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but Criminal Records Keep Men out of
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-trouble-butcriminal-records-keep-men-out-of-work.html (noting that men with criminal backgrounds account for
about thirty-four percent of nonworking men ages twenty-five to fifty-four in the United States and
discussing the challenges they face to employment); City Employee Credits Alumnus with Ending
20-Year Nightmare, DREXEL U. THOMAS R. KLINE SCH. L. (July 22, 2014),
http://drexel.edu/law/about/news/articles/overview/2014/July/epps-expungement-project/ (describing
the story of an African American female veteran with a mutual combat conviction stemming from
self-defense that prevented her from developing a career for twenty years).
2
See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104
GEO. L.J. 291, 292 (2016) (discussing modes of supervision in probation); Michelle S. Phelps, Mass
Probation: Toward a More Robust Theory of State Variation in Punishment, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y
53, 55 (2017) (discussing the effects of mass probation in the United States).
3
See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2012) (allowing owner of federally assisted housing project to terminate
tenancy of a tenant for illegal drug use); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-167(b) (West,
Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 72) (detailing the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug
related offense on civil proceedings).

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 337

7/28/20 10:48 AM

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

866

[Vol. 52:2

Not only could she not find a job, but her attempts to return to school
were thwarted given her inability to qualify for a student loan.4 Without a
steady income, and her ineligibility for public benefits5 exacerbating the
financial burden, her kids’ diets suffered. She was stuck, tangled in a web of
restrictions with no clear way out.6 Unbeknownst to Long, a Supreme Court
Justice had recognized as much over a century ago, stating that the
ex-offender “is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as
iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive
of essential liberty.”7
A reality like this confronts most who come into contact with the
criminal justice system, whether they were simply arrested8 or actually
convicted. Whenever these individuals extricate themselves from the formal
boundaries of the criminal system, the powers that be seek control in other
ways, and collateral consequences step into the breach. 9 Such consequences

4

See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012) (prohibiting students convicted of drug offenses while receiving
student aid from receiving such aid for a period of years after conviction).
5
See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(g) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.
Act 91) (declaring ineligibility for compensation after conviction of illegal receipt of benefits); see also
21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(A) (2012) (deeming offender ineligible for public benefits after a drug trafficking
conviction); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4) (2012) (mandating exclusion of persons convicted of felony drug
crimes from government health care programs); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7(b)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 116-91) (outlining implications of a misdemeanor conviction relating to controlled substances on
eligibility for health care programs); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 871(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 72) (noting the implications of false representations in acquiring
unemployment); 62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432(9) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.
Act 91) (making offender ineligible for public benefits after conviction for misdemeanor or felony until
penalty is satisfied).
6
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 140 (2010) (detailing the impact of collateral consequences on ex-offenders);
Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in I NVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–16 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind
eds., 2002) (recognizing collateral consequences as punishment because they result in the “diminution
of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal residency”); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:
Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012) (arguing
that collateral consequences serve as a reemergence of the punishment known as “civil death”); Amy P.
Meek, Street Vendors, Taxicabs, and Exclusion Zones: The Impact of Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions at the Local Level, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (describing collateral consequences
at the municipal level).
7
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
8
See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015) (arguing that arrests serve
as a “source of regulation” that encumber the liberty of the arrestee regardless of whether she is
subsequently convicted).
9
See Travis, Invisible Punishment, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that parolee and probationer
populations have increased with prison populations over the past two decades); Jenny Roberts, The
Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary
Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 740 (2008) (arguing that “nonpenal
consequences are anything but ‘collateral’ to a defendant”).
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openly restrict horizontal and vertical mobility,10 extending the reach of the
criminal system despite their convenient label as civil, regulatory measures
by legislatures and courts.11 The result is an unrestrained network of
restrictions with colossal implications for reentry into society.
In short, collateral consequences interfere with the lives of those who
contact the criminal justice system more than is just. Although some
consequences are justified in certain instances,12 existing legal constraints
have done little to restrain them.13 While redressing inequities with respect
to measures of preventive restraint14 and dangerousness15 currently receives
10
There is a voluminous scholarly literature identifying the range of collateral consequences faced
by defendants. See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2018). Those efforts, as well as some actions by courts,
have prompted organizations to attempt to catalogue the full range of consequences in a national
inventory. See, e.g., State-Specific Resources, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/state-specific-resources (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
11
See Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It: The Tenuous Line Between “Direct Punishment”
and “Collateral Consequences”, 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 346, 365 (2016) (questioning the distinction between
civil and criminal labels for punishment); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the
Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 311 (2015) (noting that governments defend collateral
consequences on the basis that they are regulatory rather than punitive).
12
John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral Consequences, 19
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 36, 37–38 (2018), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-problemwith-the-proliferation-of-collateral-consequences (noting how some collateral consequences are
legitimate and reasonable given narrow tailoring).
13
Modern courts tend to classify collateral consequences as regulatory measures rather than
full-blown punishment. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 94 (2003) (holding that notice of
sex-offender registration is “intended as a nonpunitive regulatory measure”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 511 (2003) (holding that detainment for deportable criminal aliens during removal proceedings does
not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 267–68 (1st
Cir. 2015) (holding that removal on the basis of conviction is not punishment); Turner v. Glickman, 207
F.3d 419, 429 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that disqualification for food stamp and temporary assistance for
needy families programs is not a criminal punishment); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th
Cir. 1978) (upholding the Texas scheme of disenfranchisement of convicted felons).
14
See, e.g., Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial
Detention and Release, U. PA. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 1, 1 (2017) (calling for reforms in pretrial detention).
15
See Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 58 (2018) (examining actuarial sentencing);
Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G
REP. 266, 266 (2011) (noting how risk assessment tools provide scientific support to the judgments
already made clinically by judges); J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables
and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336–37 (2011) (noting the desire to sentence
“smarter” through actuarial sentencing). Actuarial risk assessment has gained steam in a number of ways,
including with an endorsement by the American Law Institute and its enshrinement in the Model Penal
Code. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). But some scholars have
cautioned against its widespread use, calling for critical inquiry. See, e.g., Collins, supra, at 60 (noting
that scholars have questioned the use of actuarial sentencing); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous
Defendants, 127 YALE. L.J. 490, 490 (2018) (exploring the underlying question of statistical risk of
reoffending in the pretrial context); Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 2 (criticizing justifications
for pretrial detention); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 508 (2016) (raising questions regarding the future of risk assessment
in sentencing); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 702–04 (2015)
(criticizing the disconnect between actuarial risk assessment and punishment theories); Sonja B. Starr,
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significant attention, the incapacitative logic underlying the existing
collateral consequences regime is mostly subject to minor tinkering at the
margins. This, despite the fact that the incapacitative logic underlying
collateral consequences is the same as that underlying predictions about
dangerousness.16 The result is a persistent arrangement of collateral
consequences in desperate need of some pruning.
To date, reformers have tried to combat these restrictions on utilitarian
grounds. Some have pointed to their criminogenic nature.17 Others have
shown they undermine public safety, breed recidivism,18 and counteract the
public welfare.19 Still others are critiquing the notion of accurately
attempting to predict dangerousness. Recently, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights doubled down on arguments like these, calling
for reforming consequences that cannot be shown to enhance public safety.20
Modern courts have largely ignored these arguments, instead allowing
legislative classification of such restrictions as civil and non-punitive to
carry the day,21 thereby resulting in little judicial scrutiny of legislative
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803,
809 (2014) (exploring the instruments, arguments for, and limited scholarly criticisms of evidence-based
sentencing). For an especially strong criticism of risk assessment, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST
PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 111 (2007) (detailing and
critically analyzing modes of actuarial sentencing).
16
Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019–20) (manuscript at 5–6) (on file with author).
17
See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S
NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 117 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (noting how collateral
consequences increase likelihood of re-incarceration); Collins, supra note 15, at 95 (detailing studies
questioning the utility of risk assessment-based interventions, as well as their criminogenic effects for
low-risk offenders).
18
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 10 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS] (noting that “collateral consequences may frustrate the chance of successful re-entry”);
Richard P. Seiter & Karen R. Kadela, Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What Is
Promising, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 360, 360 (2003) (assessing the efficacy of prisoner reentry programs);
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community
Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 195 (2004) (questioning the relationship between voting
and recidivism).
19
JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, EX-OFFENDERS AND THE
LABOR MARKET 14 (2010) (detailing and quantifying the economic effect of low employment rates for
ex-offenders); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Anderson, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as
Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER
ALIA
11,
12
(2016); Offender
Reentry,
NAT’L
INST.
JUST.,
DEP’T
JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/corrections/reentry (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (providing information
on reentry-related issues).
20
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 133–35 (2019) [hereinafter U.S.
COMM’N].
21
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (holding that civil commitment is
non-punitive detention).
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action. This is the current state of affairs, although legal history suggests that
it need not be the case.22
This Article advocates for a different tactic. Having reframed the
question of reform from one of utility to one of desert,23 this Article takes a
deeper dive to ask whether collateral consequences stand up to retributivist
scrutiny. Although critics of collateral consequences lament the “tough on
crime” era as responsible for their rise, retributivist constraints on
punishment can be sharp hatchets ready for trimming collateral
consequences down to size. Building on a previously laid theoretical
foundation,24 this Article suggests that the punishment constraining aspects
of retributivism could partner with current efforts to reform collateral
consequences and supplement what has been tried and achieved over the
past several decades.
Retributivist ideas relating to agency and responsibility, proportionality,
personal and communal restoration, and the obligations and duties of the
state, as well as the broader community, suggest suspicion of an expansive
collateral consequences regime. This contrasts with public safety driven
arguments, which leave more room for authorities to tinker with the lives of
defendants, allowing for regulation that renders the line between criminal
and civil restrictions murky.25 This approach also has political viability
given that many state codes prioritize retribution as a purpose of and
constraint on punishment,26 retributivist themes pervade how the broader

22

Previously, the Court did not rely on legislative classification of punishment; rather, the Court
has defined punishment in response to past conduct. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 331 (1866)
(holding that states cannot punish citizens for actions that were not illegal when committed); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 377–78 (1866) (striking down an act of Congress that constituted an ex post facto
law); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 350 (1910) (overturning a sentence handed down by a
Philippine court as cruel and unusual).
23
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 5–6.
24
Id. at 1.
25
Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201,
211–12 (1996) (“Those most willing to blur the criminal-civil distinction are generally the
consequentialists-utilitarians, who do not see ‘doing justice’ as an important value in itself and are happy
to ignore desert in favor of a distribution of sanctions that might more efficiently reduce crime. As noted,
they see crime and tort as just two similar mechanisms of behavior control through disincentives.”); see
David Garland, The Birth of the Welfare Sanction, 8 BRIT. J.L. & SOC’Y 29, 41–42 (1981) (discussing
four ways in which theoretical compromises have collapsed various criminological schools of thought).
One might argue that collateral consequences are the unintended consequence (ironically) of prioritizing
utilitarian theories of punishment in the administration of criminal law. The utilitarian theories bleed
across the criminal-civil line as low-cost interventions.
26
PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER SCOT WILLIAMS, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, in
MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: VARIATIONS ACROSS THE 50 STATES 3, 5–6 (2018) (noting that
retributive justice serves as a guiding principle for thirty states).
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public perceives justice in the criminal system,27 and limiting collateral
consequences accords with the notion of limited government.28
In short, retributivist constraints breed skepticism of a vast collateral
consequences apparatus. Legislatures that prioritize retribution as a
justification for and constraint on punishment should think clearly about
whether existing collateral consequences result in disproportionate
suffering. Committed retributivists within the system, especially
prosecutors, should consider how to approach the imposition of collateral
consequences when acting in their respective roles. Finally, the
incorporation of retributivist constraints in phases where blameworthiness is
not at stake, but serious collateral consequences are, would allow for robust
procedural protections for defendants and petitioners, particularly in certain
phases, like those relating to expungement.
This Article continues to connect scholarship relating to the rise of
collateral consequences and pervasive social and structural realities in the
criminal system with retributivist punishment theory, ultimately providing a
retributive accounting of the collateral consequences regime. Its
contributions proceed in three parts. Part I identifies the need for constraints
on collateral consequences, pointing to how public safety driven rationales,
stemming from utilitarian purposes for punishment, allow for little more
than tinkering around the margins. Reformers have fallen into the trap of
arguing for reform on these grounds.29 The interpretive story in this section
draws from the theoretical foundation laid in a previous work.30 Part II
examines the components of retributivism that provide the tools for cutting
the collateral consequences regime down to size: (1) a concern for dignity
and human responsibility; (2) robust considerations of blameworthiness in
light of modern day criminalization; (3) the proportionality principle; (4) the
relationship between desert and the plea-bargaining norm; and (5) the
inherently restorative components of some theories of retributivism.31 Part
III lays out the system-wide implications of this critique, noting how
27

Michael O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Violent Crime and Punitiveness: An Empirical Study of
Public Opinion, 103 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 50–51) (on file with author).
28
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 8 (noting retributivist themes in law and the populace).
29
See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 133–35 (recommending the tailoring of collateral
consequences to serve public policy).
30
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 1–2.
31
I am mindful that there is disagreement about this last point. Some scholars argue that restorative
components are not essential to retributivism. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of
Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1522–23 (2016) (suggesting that restorative
components are part of another punishment theory, namely reconstructivism). As I understand it,
reconstructivism emphasizes the social utility of the criminal law, making solidarity the focal point of
the analysis. Reconstructivists classify retributivists in deontological terms. My sense is that
non-deontological retributivists are extremely close to reconstructivist theory, given that social
restoration is a byproduct of individual desert. Peter Koritansky, Two Theories of Retributive
Punishment: Immanuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas, 22 HIST. PHIL. Q. 319, 321, 323, 330 (2005).
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viewing collateral consequences through a retributivist lens would affect
some notable collateral consequences, as well as lesser-known ones. It also
has ramifications for discretionary decision making by retributivist actors
within the system, legislative reform efforts, and the procedural protections
afforded to defendants and petitioners in a phase-like expungement. It then
concludes, suggesting that reformers that leave retributivism behind do so at
their own peril.
I. THE NEED TO CONSTRAIN COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
The tentacles of collateral consequences are nearly impossible to break
free from. One estimate puts the total number of collateral consequences at
just under forty-five thousand restrictions.32 They exist at the federal, state,
and municipal level.33 They take away civil rights, privileges associated with
citizenship such as the ability to vote,34 property rights,35 and family
interests.36 Some are automatically imposed upon mere contact with the
system, whereas others are tied to conviction. Both state and private actors
can enforce them. And in some instances, they can last a lifetime.37

32
See Nat’l Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Collateral Consequences
Inventory, JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2019)
(listing 44,605 collateral consequences of a criminal conviction in the United States from various
jurisdictions).
33
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91) (outlining a collateral
consequence for defendants in federally assisted housing); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
780-167(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 72) (detailing the impact of a final criminal
conviction in a drug related offense on eviction proceedings); see also Meek, supra note 6, at 4–5
(describing the collateral consequences of criminal convictions found in municipal policies that prevent
individuals from living, working, or participating in their local communities).
34
Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx (noting that many states
have laws that make felons ineligible to vote).
35
See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-167(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess. Act 72) (detailing the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug related offense on eviction
proceedings).
36
See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 3041.189(a)(1) (Westlaw through 2019 legislation) (stating that the
parent is disqualified from participating in the subsidized childcare program if a court finds the parent
guilty of fraud in applying for subsidized childcare).
37
See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225.503(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019
Reg. Sess. Act 72), invalidated by Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003) (holding that
the statute violated employees’ due process right to pursue a specific occupation by prohibiting nursing
homes, home health care agencies, and other long-term care facilities from hiring anyone with a theft
conviction). Though invalidated, the law has not been amended and enforcement remains subject to the
priorities of state agencies. See 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225.103 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 72) (defining “facility” as including the following: “a domiciliary care
home[,] . . . a home health care agency[,] . . . a long-term care nursing facility[,] . . . an older adult daily
living center[,] . . . a personal care home”).
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While some restrictions existed at common law,38 in addition to shaming
and shunning tactics by the community, the resulting loss of status that
persists today is a new phenomenon.39 These consequences exploded onto
the scene and grew exponentially in the latter half of the twentieth century.40
In the mid-1980s, there was a glimmer of hope that they were headed for
demise; the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners
announced that the “era of collateral consequences was drawing to a
close.”41 That hope was permanently dashed by Congress with a number of
measures in the mid-1990s that broadly disqualified ex-offenders from a
host of social benefits and privileges.42
The roots of these restrictions are fundamentally utilitarian, which has
led to confusion as to their purpose and whether they should be classified as
punishment or not.43 That confusion has resulted in modern judicial
classification of such measures as largely civil and regulatory, despite their
incapacitative and condemnatory intent and effect.44 It also has resulted,
unintentionally, in criticism of the restrictions on only utilitarian terms.
Reform efforts have been slow.
While the recent Supreme Court has recognized the harsh effects of
collateral consequences, it has stopped short of declaring them to be criminal
punishment despite the fact that its own earlier definition of punishment
would seem to encompass them. Earlier Court precedent had no qualms
38
See, e.g., Sutton v. McIlhany, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 235, 236 (1848) (noting that all offenses were
pardonable under common law with a few exceptions).
39
Chin, supra note 6, at 1790–91; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment:
A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 27 (2010) (“Based on conviction of a serious
crime, a person loses civil rights, including political, property, and family rights, temporarily or
permanently.”).
40
Mayson, supra note 11, at 307.
41
Chin & Love, supra note 39, at 30.
42
See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, §§ 501–10, 572–77, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 670–73, 684–87 (1996) (restricting benefits for aliens);
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§
408(9), 202, 821, 903, 110 Stat. 2105, 2139, 2185, 2321, 2348 (1996) (denying social security benefits,
food stamps, housing assistance to fugitive felons); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–02, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–18 (1996) (restricting the number of appeals
a defendant can make for a habeas claim and limiting the statute of limitation to one year for habeas
claims); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (requiring sex offenders to register a current
address) (superseded by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 102, 120 Stat. 587, 590 (2006)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat.
4181, 4300 (1988) (containing sections that sanction drug-related crimes with punishments, such as
termination of public housing benefits); see also Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the Punitiveness of
“New-Generation” SORN Laws, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 426, 426–27 (2018) (referencing sex offender
and registration (SORN) laws as a method of social control).
43
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 4.
44
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 97 (describing the American carceral system as embracing an
approach focused on “permanent exclusion”).
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about recognizing collateral consequences as punitive. The Court has
defined punishment as a deprivation in response to past conduct,45 which
seemingly would encompass many collateral consequences—certainly those
imposed automatically by virtue of conviction. After all, something like a
license restriction or denial of eligibility for a public benefit qualifies as a
deprivation and would not occur for many ex-offenders had they not been
convicted. That is a position once held by the Supreme Court.46
Nevertheless, resting on the utilitarian roots of collateral consequences,
which also underlie many civil laws, the Court has emphasized legislative
labeling as crucial to the analysis.47 Laws that are not expressly based on
retribution or deterrence will be labeled non-punitive, and not criminal
punishment.48 As Smith v. Doe held at the beginning of this century,49 as
long as a consequence is labeled non-punitive or civil by the legislature, it
likely will not be considered punishment.50 This conflates the definition of
punishment with its legislatively assigned justification, arbitrarily excludes
incapacitation as a purpose and trait of punishment, and conflicts with other
Court precedent that recognizes that the Constitution refrains from
mandating any one penal theory.51 This approach also insulates collateral
consequences from concerns about punishment being too harsh.52 The
practical result has been judicial classification of collateral consequences as
45
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 286 (1866); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 337 (1866)
(“[E]xclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can
be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct.”). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 273–74 (1980) (referencing “‘accessories’ included within the punishment”).
46
See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 286 (noting that deprivation of a privilege is a punishment); Garland,
71 U.S. at 377 (stating that an exclusion from any professions for past conduct is a punishment).
47
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236–37 (1972) (per
curiam); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946);
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898); Julia L. Torti, Note, Accounting for Punishment in
Proportionality Review, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1940 (2013) (“[T]he punishment cadena temporal in
Weems included a permanent loss of political and civil rights.” (footnote omitted)).
48
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96 (“In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based
its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of
punishment—that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.—it has been considered penal. But
a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some
other legitimate governmental purpose.” (footnotes omitted)).
49
538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
50
See id. (holding that only if the “regulatory scheme . . . is ‘“so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil,”’ will the Court consider classifying the statute as
a punitive measure (alteration in original)); see also Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the
Perils of Categorical Ambiguity, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77, 91 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 2011) (noting that “Trop’s view of collateral consequences remains the consensus among
American courts (though not without exception)”).
51
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003).
52
Kaiser, supra note 11, at 354–55 (detailing how the Supreme Court, over the past century, has
leaned too heavily on legislative labeling and has confused definitions with justifications for punishment,
thereby resulting in a test that renders it nearly impossible for a collateral consequence to be labeled
punishment).
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civil regulatory measures and not punishment,53 with legislatures and
administrative agencies reaffirming this logic.54
There are two problems with this doctrine. First, it departs from prior
Supreme Court precedent that recognized collateral consequences, even if
labeled civil, as fundamentally punitive. In other words, the threshold issue
as to the definition of punishment—and whether collateral consequences fit
it—has been answered differently in American history, both at the federal
and state judicial level. Second, the Court’s current doctrine, by restricting
the definition of punishment to only those measures where the legislature
has stated retribution or deterrence as its purpose, arbitrarily excludes
incapacitation as a purpose behind punishment.55 In short, the Court’s
narrow definition of punishment in Smith v. Doe ignores the utilitarianpunitive roots of collateral consequences, thereby simultaneously requiring
reform on exclusively utilitarian grounds (because retributivism’s
constraints only apply to “punishment”).
So why have reform efforts failed? The answer is the social impulse
underlying collateral consequences: control.56 The measures are not
calibrated to blameworthiness or desert; rather, they are variations of
utilitarian interventions, designed to protect against dangerousness,

53
See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1997) (holding that the “Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a bar to the later criminal prosecution because the administrative
proceedings were civil, not criminal”); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (ruling that in
rem forfeiture of property involved in crime is not classified as a punishment governed by the Double
Jeopardy Clause). The Court did, however, clarify that framing punishment discussions in terms of
“criminal” and “civil” labels was not entirely useful. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48
(1989) (“The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the
civil and the criminal law . . . .”). Other federal courts have refrained from labeling sex offender
registration and other collateral consequences, such as disenfranchisement or employment restrictions,
as punishment. See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (stating that legislation that
prevents a felon from holding office in any waterfront labor organization is not punishment); United
States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a law mandating the registration of sex
offenders is a civil regulatory measure, rather than punitive, because the statutory scheme is consistent
with a preventive goal); United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 627 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the
sex offender registration laws did not punish the defendant for his past sex offenses and that the law is
nonpunitive); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 752–53 (6th Cir. 2010) (ruling that a law conditioning
the restoration of felons’ voting rights on certain obligations was not a punishment because it had
legislative, non-punitive intent and did not promote the traditional goals of punishment).
54
See Ewald, supra note 50, at 83–84, n.41, 91, n.86 (explaining that (1) the Denial of Federal
Benefits Program permits courts to deny certain benefits to people convicted of drug offenses in order to
deter drug crime; and (2) courts define most collateral consequences as regulatory and preventive);
Milena Tripkovic, Collateral Consequences of Conviction: Limits and Justifications, 18 CRIMINOLOGY
CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y 18, 18 (2017) (“The legal stance taken in the United States is that collateral
consequences are not punishment, but constitute regulatory measures . . . .”).
55
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (referencing “civil” incapacitation and
overlooking the fact that incapacitation is a justification for punishment).
56
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 25 (“[C]ollateral consequences . . . reflect
two different social impulses: control through incapacitation and the maximization of social welfare.”).
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categorize the risky, and prevent future bad acts and crimes.57 As creatures
of cost calculation, they are prone to endless tinkering by policymakers.58
Historically, and prior to the age of big data, they promised public safety at
little structural or social cost given the Court’s punishment doctrine, making
them intuitively appealing at the policy level.59
In other words, the punitive impulse inspiring dangerousness and risk
control measures took root in collateral consequences.60 As crime increased,
the need for more and more control was enacted into law through
incapacitative measures that used criminal behavior as proxy for future
dangerousness.61 This coincided with the prioritization of utilitarian thinking
within the Model Penal Code62 and data-driven welfare maximization within
the administrative state.63 Legislatures could account for perceived
shortcomings in direct sentences with collateral consequences. In short, the
pervasive network of collateral consequences aligns with utilitarian goals for
punishment, and the willingness of courts to de-classify such consequences
as punitive helped the process.64
57

Dolovich, supra note 17, at 98 (“The logic of this organizational system is simple: those who are
judged undesirable or otherwise unworthy lose their status as moral and political subjects and are kept
beyond the bounds of mainstream society.”); Ewald, supra note 50, at 95 (“[M]any collateral sanctions
are said to pursue classic regulatory aims, reducing risk and protecting the public’s ‘health, safety, or
right to peaceful enjoyment’ . . . .”).
58
Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 1015 (2016)
(“Instrumentalists like to flatter themselves that their rationalism is more humane than moralistic
approaches, and sometimes it is . . . . Instrumental rationalism has no source of constraint, no
counterbalancing force, except better instrumentalism, which is unreliable, especially in particular cases.
The principle of instrumental punishment with respect to the worst offenders is ‘more, cheaper.’”
(footnote omitted)).
59
Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem
of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 321 (1984) (noting how the utilitarian model “suggests that the
balance between punishment and enforcement levels should be heavily tilted toward punishment”).
60
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 100 (mentioning how recent scholarship shows that the alleged
rehabilitative ideal during the latter half of the twentieth century was actually contingent on regional
differences in approach); WILLIAM R. KELLY ET AL., FROM RETRIBUTION TO PUBLIC SAFETY:
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 177 (2017) (emphasizing movement away
from retributive principles towards anti-recidivism measures); Paul H. Robinson, Commentary,
Punishing Dangerousness: Clocking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429,
1433–34 (2001) (describing how rising crime after the 1950s led to the prioritization of deterrence).
61
Ewald, supra note 50, at 80 (“Several core concerns of the criminological literature, such as the
contemporary desire to denigrate and stigmatize offenders, the move toward ‘actuarial justice,’ and the
pervasive desire to reduce costs, do capture important elements of American collateral sanctions
policy.”).
62
Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose
of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2000) (referencing how MPC § 1.02 omitted
retribution).
63
Travis, supra note 6, at 19 (“The principal new form of social exclusion has been to deny
offenders the benefits of the welfare state.”).
64
A quick word about method. This argument is not contingent on causation. Rather, it is
interpretive, aiming to explain the interior logic of collateral consequences and how they resemble the
pursuit of utilitarian purposes for punishment.
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In fairness, states have begun to reform their collateral consequences
regimes over the past two decades. Some of this reform has occurred in the
wake of litigation challenging the rationality behind collateral consequences
laws.65 Other rollbacks have been the result of criticism of the social utility
of such laws given that they might be criminogenic66 and in fact undermine
public safety.67 Concerns about excessive stigmatic harm have also been
articulated, but usually along the lines that the harm breeds recidivism.68 In
other words, reform efforts are operating along utilitarian lines.69
The pace of reform has been exceedingly slow. While forty-one states
passed over one hundred and fifty laws in total to limit employment-related
barriers between 2009 and 2014, the quality of the reforms left much to be
desired.70 They are narrow in scope and do little to incentivize reentry-style
action on the part of third parties that might enforce collateral
consequences.71
These developments lead to two observations. First, that the terrain for
assessing collateral consequences remains fundamentally utilitarian, both
due to their roots and their classification by courts as non-punishment.
Second, if the last two decades have shown anything, reforms are occurring
slower than many would like. While some collateral consequences have
been reformed or altered to be less expansive, thousands remain on the books
for relatively minor crimes. Furthermore, reformers have focused more on
65
Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and Constitutional
Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 233, 254, 258–59 (2018).
66
RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, 2009-2014, at 1, 30 (2014),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/relief-in-sight-states-rethinkthe-collateral-consequences-of-criminal-conviction-2009-2014/legacy_downloads/states-rethinkcollateral-consequences-report-v4.pdf (referencing state legislation designed to improve public safety).
67
See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 133–35 (finding that restrictions on public housing and
public benefits can “lead the formerly incarcerated person towards unlawful means to earn subsistence
money”).
68
See Matthew Makarios et al., Examining the Predictors of Recidivism Among Men and Women
Released from Prison in Ohio, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1377, 1387 (2010) (“Thus, the data indicate
that a large portion of parolees (one fourth were rearrested for a new felony) commit new crimes within
their first 12 months in the community and that this is influenced in part by difficulties that inmates face
when adjusting to life in the community.”); see also Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura,
Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 330
(2009) (discussing the lingering effects of a criminal record on employment prospects and comparing the
risk of arrest between individuals with prior criminal records and the general population).
69
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 37–38; STEPHEN SLIVINSKI, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF ECON. LIBERTY AT ARIZ. STATE UNIV., TURNING SHACKLES INTO BOOTSTRAPS: WHY
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING REFORM IS THE MISSING PIECE OF CRIMINAL J USTICE REFORM 1, 2 (2016)
(presenting evidence that states with restrictive occupational licensing laws have higher rates of
recidivism); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 33 (discussing how reform efforts have been
designed to pursue public safety).
70
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 4.
71
Id. at 33.
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remedies designed to remediate the effects of such consequences rather than
go after the consequences themselves.72 This lack of success stems from the
misclassification of collateral consequences as non-punitive and the
unwillingness to take retributivist constraints on such consequences
seriously, coupled with cost-benefit logic driving policy debates in the
criminal field. Goalpost shifting, the epistemic shortcomings underlying that
logic, and the structural inequities already present within the system—lack
of awareness of collateral consequences,73 the burdens on defense counsel,
and the realities of the plea-bargaining norm—exacerbate the problem.74 A
broader critique than social disutility is necessary, which is where
retributivism and its constraints come into play.75
II. RETRIBUTIVISM, SYSTEMIC REALITIES, AND COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
This Section offers a retributivist assessment of the collateral
consequences regime in light of legal and social realities within the criminal
system. Building from the core premises of the critique presented in prior
work, it analyzes collateral consequences through the retributivist lens in
light of the prevalence of prosecuting misdemeanor and order-maintenance
offenses, plea bargaining, and some form of liberty deprivation (either
incarceration or probation) persisting as the direct sentence. These social
realities affect the implications of retributive justice for collateral
consequences.76 In particular, they interact with notions of blameworthiness,
proportionality, and restoration, and the social relationships at the core of
retributivist thought.

72

Id. at 21.
Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences,
49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1157–58 (2015); Roberts, The Mythical Divide, supra note 9, at 702.
74
Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 12 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 213, 214–15 (2016) (“Where bargaining is the norm, the contents of the bargain should be clear.
But for the majority of criminal defendants, aided or unaided by counsel, the full force of a criminal
conviction is only felt and known after the most immediate consequences—probation, prison, and
possibly fines—are in the rear view mirror. Many criminal defendants who plead guilty know very little,
if anything, about the long-term and wide-ranging consequences of their willingness to confess guilt.”
(footnotes omitted)).
75
As mentioned in Collateral Consequences, retributivism is not a panacea here. Rather, it allows
for a sharper and bolder critique of collateral consequences given its non-negotiable, built-in constraints.
See Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 39 (noting how retribution contains “built in
safeguards . . . [that] caution against an expansive number of interventions in the form of collateral
consequences” (footnote omitted)).
76
Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L.
1, 32–33 (2012).
73
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A. The Essence of Retributivism
There are numerous retributivist theories that have manifested
throughout legal history.77 They have their differences; they also have their
similarities. For purposes of this Article, it is worth pointing out the renewed
interest in retributivism that emerged in the wake of inequitable outcomes in
the rehabilitative era and the harsh sentencing characterized by the
incapacitative “tough on crime” era. 78 As mentioned elsewhere, this resulted
in the Model Penal Code reviving retribution as the primary goal of and
constraint on punishment.79 This section aims to advance the conversation
one step further by noting how the shared premises of many versions of
retributivism would view collateral consequences.80
What are those shared premises? There are a few: (1) recognition of the
dignity, responsibility, and autonomy of offenders; (2) a concern for moral,
or at least political-legal blameworthiness; (3) proportionality; (4)
restoration of individual and communal equilibrium; and (5) state and
communal duties vis-à-vis the accused and convicted after the exaction of
punishment.81
Retributive theories assume human responsibility for human actions,
although how that responsibility manifests itself in measured desert differs
77
See Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 40–41 (tracing the various thinkers
putting forth retributivism as the primary justification for punishment).
78
48 Michael Tonry, Punishment and Human Dignity: Sentencing Principles for
Twenty-First-Century America, in AMERICAN SENTENCING—WHAT HAPPENS AND WHY? 119, 122–23
(Michael Tonry ed., 2019). For discussions of the meaning and ethical basis of the retributive theory and
punishment, see JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973) (analyzing the concept of desert and
examining its role in the justification of punishment); Max Atkinson, Justified and Deserved
Punishments, 78 MIND ASS’N 354, 354–55 (1969) (discussing different justifications for punishment and
the difference between a “just” and a “deserved” punishment); Sidney Glendin, A Plausible Theory of
Retribution, 5 J. VALUE INQUIRY 1 (1970). See also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
230–37 (2008) (describing a basic model of the retributive theory and its variants); Donald Clark Hodges,
Punishment, 18 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 209, 214–18 (1957) (discussing the disagreement
among philosophers concerning the meaning and just function of punishment); John Laird, The
Justification of Punishment, 41 MONIST 352, 355–56 (1931) (discussing theories to which punishment is
said to be justified); C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 13 ISSUES RELIGION &
PSYCHOTHERAPY 147, 148 (1987) (discussing the humanitarian theory of punishment and how it
“removes from [p]unishment the concept of [d]esert”); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52
MONIST 475, 476 (1968) (arguing that there is right to punishment by contrasting a system of punishment
with a system of therapy); C.W.K. Mundle, Punishment and Desert, 4 PHIL. Q. 216, 221 (1954)
(commenting on different theories of punishment and proposing another version of the retributive
theory); Lisa H. Perkins, Suggestion for a Justification of Punishment, 81 ETHICS 55, 61 (1970) (arguing
“that legal punishment is justified if and only if the possibility of extralegal revenge is, in general,
present”).
79
Cotton, supra note 62, at 1320 (referencing how MPC § 1.02 omitted retribution).
80
My goal is not to reconcile retributive theories with nuanced differences. Rather, it is to point out
baselines generally shared by retributivist theories that emphasize desert as the organizing principle
behind punishment.
81
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 42.
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across theories.82 But at their core, retributivist theories recognize human
agency and the dignity it implies.83 This means punishment regimes have to
account for human dignity by avoiding the instrumentalization of persons.
Retributivists are skeptical of benefits that come at the cost of punishing
needlessly those who do not deserve it.84
This underlying principle supports retributive constraints relating to
blameworthiness and proportionality. Wrongdoing is a precondition for
punishment and the quantity of wrongdoing (the desert basis) informs the
measure of punishment. Calibration of the moral blameworthiness of the act
to its disruption of the baseline societal situation is necessary. 85 That can
imply a contextual analysis of the situation surrounding the wrongdoing,
including the political order in which the offense occurs.86 Other demands
of justice and structural and social realities constrain retributive justice.87
The dignity roots of retributivism implicate individual dignity and
communal relationships. Because members of a community share claim to
certain basic goods, disruptions to that order require redress as a matter of
justice.88 As Jeffrie Murphy emphasized, “punishment implicates the
82

See id. at 43 (discussing different conceptions of desert).
See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., reprt.
1988) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who
receive it.”); John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 96 (1999) (“The
intrinsic worth of what truly benefits me has the same worth in the lives of any other persons who do or
could share in that kind of benefit. This truth and our primary understanding of it are the primary source
of all human community, more decisive than any emotion of sympathy or subrational instinct of
solidarity.”); Michael S. Moore, A Tale of Two Theories, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 27, 31 (2009) (“The
theory is retributivist in its justification of punishment and punishment institutions: we justly punish
because and only because offenders deserve to suffer for their culpable wrongdoings.”); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 7 (1985) (“The
criminal is a parasite or freerider on a mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation . . . . He must
thus suffer punishment as a ‘debt’ he owes to his fellow citizens . . . .”).
84
Emad H. Atiq, What Unconditional Credence in Individual Desert Claims Does Retributivism
Require?, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 138, 139, https://illinoislawreview.org/uncategorized/whatunconditional-credence-in-individual-desert-claims-does-retributivism-require/ (“[T]he retributivist will
only pursue future crime prevention subject to a strict moral side constraint: the good consequences
cannot be purchased at the cost of punishing those who do not deserve it.” (footnote omitted)).
85
Koritansky, supra note 31, at 335 (“Some crimes, however, are committed less voluntarily than
others, and thus involve less of an overindulgence of the will. Under this principle . . . the law can impose
more lenient penalties for crimes committed less voluntarily (and therefore less culpably).”).
86
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 45 (“Put simply, an offender’s
blameworthiness, situated against the broader social situation, matters for both justifying punishment and
the nature of the sanction.”).
87
Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2207 (2001) (“Once we
consider punishment as a social practice, we have to consider it ex ante, as one attractive practice among
others. Once viewed as a social institution responding to a social problem, retributivism must consider
the social cost dimension of the wrong and then calibrate the severity of the response.”).
88
See, e.g., id. at 2191–2205 (discussing how his confrontational conception of retribution treats
human beings as moral agents who must be reprimanded by the state for claiming relational, legal, and
83
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maintenance of the political situation inherent to human existence and
specific to a political regime.”89 Murphy emphasized this point throughout
his work, recognizing how the disruption of political and social equality
warrants punishment.90 For some, that puts Murphy in the reconstructivist
camp, which focuses on the social functions of punishment, with solidarity
across the moral culture as the key to punishment.91 For Murphy, retribution
aims to restore order through punishment, leaving room for some versions92
of retributivism to contain forward-looking components through their
built-in constraints.93 Punishment should go no farther than necessary to
equalize liberty under the law.94 Otherwise it becomes disruptive, amounting
to extra, unjustified punishment.95
Retributivism also imposes limiting principles on the actions of state and
private actors. It recognizes that the state is the only legitimate punisher
given its primary responsibility as facilitator of the equilibrium mentioned

political superiority); Markel, Retributive Justice, supra note 76, at 1 (“[O]nce we understand the basis
for our presumptive political obligations within liberal democracies, a more capacious approach to
establishing criminal laws can be tolerated from a political retributivist perspective.”).
89
Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 48.
90
Murphy, supra note 83, at 6–7.
91
Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 31, at 1492.
92
Murphy, supra note 83, at 6–7. Retributivists that draw largely on pre-Kantian thought to justify
punishment acknowledge the restorative nature of retributive theory. John Finnis notes how “punishment
has a medicinal value; as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender.” Finnis,
supra note 83, at 97 (citation omitted). Further, by healing the disruption, it is medicine for the
community. Id. In fact, this might be construed as value-added, contra utilitarian theories of punishment,
which only focus on prevention and do nothing with respect to restoration of the social imbalance.
93
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 38 (1968) (recognizing
reconciliation with the social order as the concern of the retributivist); Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State’s
Interest in Retribution, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283, 289–90 (1994) (“According to Morris, the
criminal is a freerider on a mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation and must be punished to
annul the excess unfair advantage his wrongful failure to exercise self-restraint has given him over those
citizens who have been law-abiding.”); Morris, supra note 78, at 478 (“[I]t is just to punish those who
have violated the rules and caused the unfair distribution of benefits and burdens. A person who violates
the rules has something others have—the benefits of the system—but by renouncing what others have
assumed, the burden of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage.”); Markel, Retributive Justice,
supra note 76, at 5 (noting how retribution is built on a belief in moral accountability, equal liberty under
the law, and the obligations of the state in response to wrongdoing).
94
Markel, Retributive Justice, supra note 76, at 27. Reconstructivists would argue that modern-day
retributivism does not prioritize this social component. That may be true, although it probably depends
on the type of retributivism. If desert is all that justifies punishment, then that seems likely. But if
individual desert plus maintenance of the social order are twin goals, then it is difficult to see how
reconstructivism is not similar to older forms of retributivism that emphasize reinstalling the order of just
equality, the latter two concepts being social terms.
95
Murphy, The State’s Interest in Retribution, supra note 93, at 296–97. This is a relevant point
when thinking about the expansiveness of the collateral consequences regime. It is possible that collateral
consequences could operate as a disadvantage that aims towards the restoration talked about above. But
if liberty is taken away first through incarceration, or some other liberty restraining measure (like
probation), are collateral consequences (especially those that are automatic) always extra punishment?
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before.96 Further, the limits of retributivism suggest extra-judicial suffering
inflicted by non-state actors—such as decision makers imposing collateral
consequences whether legally permissible or not—could be overstepping
their bounds depending on the context.97 This is one way that retributivism
accounts for communal attempts at revenge or the infliction of extra desert.98
It also should breed humility on the part of the state, meaning caution as to
going overboard with direct sanctions, or with giving license to private
parties to enforce them.99
These core concerns—individual and communal dignity, restoration,
proportionality, and the limits of authority to exact punishment—animate
the following sections that identify potential retributivist contributions to
mitigating the existing collateral consequences regime.
B. Blameworthiness and Modern-Day Crime
That misdemeanor and order-maintenance crimes comprise a large
number of criminal prosecutions has significant implications because the
but-for cause of many indirect consequences—the arrests and convictions
themselves—have a tenuous relationship with the understandings of
blameworthiness underlying retributive thinking. Retribution is only
directed at wrongs, which could be construed as moral or socio-political
wrongdoing depending on the retributivist camp.100 That distinction has
important consequences for whether collateral consequences might be
viewed as properly reflective of blameworthiness.
There are really two issues with notions of blameworthiness and
collateral consequences. The first involves whether blameworthiness can
possibly be attributed to the crime precipitating imposition of the
consequence, and the second involves a proper notion of gradations of
blameworthiness. Although there are many different kinds of retributive
96
Of course, different retributivist theories locate authority in the state for different reasons, usually
related to the underlying social, political, and moral philosophy.
97
Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 72
(1980) (analyzing social functionality of retribution from an economics lens).
98
Finnis, supra note 83, at 102 (“Retributive punishment . . . is thus remote indeed from revenge.
Punishment cannot be imposed by the victim as such. Indeed, it cannot rightly be imposed on behalf of
the victim as such, but only on behalf of the community of citizens willing to abide by the law.”). The
pre and post-Kantian split is most stark on this point. Whereas Kant struggled with the notion of the lex
talionis, and has been rightly criticized for its potential savagery, early retributivist thinkers
foreshadowed the idea that retribution contains limiting principles on punishment. Koritansky, supra note
31, at 329 (“[Punishment] does not long for the suffering of the criminal for its own sake, but for the
equality of justice that will be restored by that suffering.”).
99
Mary Sigler, Humility, Not Doubt: A Reply to Adam Kolber, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 158,
162, https://illinoislawreview.org/uncategorized/humility-not-doubt/ (noting that because retribution is
based on certain moral claims, without 100% certainty, it “entails humility”).
100
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366–68 (1981); Lewis, supra note 78, at 148
(“It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust.”).
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theory, they all share the view that blameworthiness is crucial to determine
the justice of a punishment.101 The Supreme Court has affirmed the same
principle;102 the concept ran through several common law doctrines from the
time of the Founding and inheres within the procedural protections afforded
to criminal defendants in the Constitution.103 For malum in se offenses—like
homicide, sexual offenses, or violent crime—the classical retributivist
would seem to have less of a problem. After all, the moral wrongdoing seems
clear, such that imposition of a penalty that attempts to communicate and
reiterate the wrongfulness of the activity seems appropriate. The same would
be true for the political retributivist as those same crimes are cardinal
violations of the underlying political contract.
The real problem relates to the consequences that stem from crimes that
are not so clearly malum in se, or are affirmatively malum prohibita (full
blown creatures of positive law). There, social pathologies relating to crime,
the nature of the crime itself,104 and ignorance of law problems105 can make
blameworthiness seem more questionable. And when direct sentences
already exist for these crimes, collateral consequences, especially those
imposed automatically by the state, seem to be inverting the typical
blameworthiness calculation. The same is true for arrests that result in
collateral consequences.106 It could be the case that existing collateral
consequences could justifiably replace the current direct sentence to serve
as a consequence that is more appropriately calibrated to blameworthiness,
but that is not the norm today.
For example, misdemeanor prosecutions might involve fairly common
conduct, but due to policing priorities, racial disparities, or a range of other
circumstances, do not all share the same quantum of blameworthiness.107
Minor offenses, like petty retail theft, turnstile jumping, possession of a

101
Tonry, supra note 78, at 128. Concededly, some retributivists might define blameworthiness
according to social harm caused.
102
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
103
John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 963–64 (2011); see generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958) (emphasizing how criminal procedure provisions mirror
the criminal law’s purpose to express condemnation when blameworthiness has been proven).
104
Joseph E. Kennedy et al., Sharks and Minnows in the War on Drugs: A Study of Quantity, Race,
and Drug Type in Drug Arrests, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 732 (2018) (highlighting how a significant
portion of drug arrests involve a gram or less of an illegal substance).
105
Hugh LaFollette, Collateral Consequences of Punishment: Civil Penalties Accompanying
Formal Punishment, 241 J. APP. PHIL. 251, 255 (2005) (describing how the fact that many collateral
consequences are barely public suggests nonculpable ignorance of the law).
106
Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 8, at 812.
107
Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 956 (2018)
(“Misdemeanors often involve common conduct—driving with a suspended license and other traffic
offenses, marijuana possession, minor assault, and minor theft.” (footnote omitted)).
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small amount of marijuana, or graffiti in a public park can result in
significant penalties, including something like deportation.108
In short, these extremely low-level crimes suffer from what Josh Bowers
has labeled a “normative innocence” problem.109 According to Bowers,
offenders are normatively innocent when unlawful activity is undeserving
of communal condemnation for some reason.110 Murphy said something
similar, noting how retribution is cognizant of particularized
considerations.111 Important moral differences between cases are relevant
because the criminal code—especially the most questionable malum
prohibita crimes—does not track normative guilt perfectly.112
But, collateral consequences that apply in a blanket fashion to all
convictions—with questionable degrees of normative blameworthiness—
would seem to cut too broadly. Public order violations come to mind first;
these are the work of municipal prosecutions, ensnaring tons of defendants
on a daily basis. But each public order violation—even if the charge listed
on the plea deal is the same for two defendants—might contain a different
gradation of blameworthiness. In some instances, blameworthiness might be
absent entirely. But because many collateral consequences use arrests or
convictions as proxies for blameworthiness across the board, they may
overreach in this regard.
Collateral consequences are also notoriously vague. Many statutes
restrict the ability to obtain a license of some sort to those who have not been
convicted of a “felony” or “crime of moral turpitude.”113 Denials of public
benefits operate along similar lines. While some collateral consequences
have become more specific in the wake of litigation, blanket collateral
consequences undermine the concern for individualized punishment,
tailored to a robust notion of blameworthiness that accounts for human
complexity in wrongdoing.114 Retribution is designed to treat human beings
108
Max Rivlin-Nadler, Yes, New Yorkers CAN Be Deported for Jumping a Turnstile, VILLAGE
VOICE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/02/27/yes-new-yorkers-can-be-deportedfor-jumping-a-turnstile/.
109
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1678 (2010).
110
Id.
111
Id.; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 171 (1988) (“This demand for individuation—a tailoring of our
retributive response to the individual natures of the persons with whom we are dealing—is a part of what
we mean by taking persons seriously as persons and is thus a basic demand of justice.”).
112
Bowers, supra note 109, at 1679 (“[W]hen determining appropriate punishment, adjudicators
must take account of salient moral differences between one case and another.”).
113
DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 3
(2009), available at http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/OPA/I/CCOACC_2009.pdf (describing
statutes restricting licensing and employment on the basis of criminal convictions related to moral
turpitude).
114
Interestingly, this logic applies to constitutional challenges to overbroad collateral consequences
that have been conducted at the state level. See, e.g., Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003).
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as moral agents who are responsible for their actions. Some collateral
consequences mean more to some than others. Further, these statutes are
often interpreted by institutional actors, disconnecting blameworthiness
evaluations from the broader community.
It is important to recognize that the normative innocence problem that
Bowers identifies is really only a huge problem for the moral retributivist,
and even there, important distinctions could be drawn between Kantian
retribution and other types. The political-legal retributivist only has to test
for moral wrongdoing born from the underlying political-legal project. This
can result in presumptive blameworthiness even for offenses that would be
viewed as questionable by a moral retributivist as long as they are legitimate
offspring of the regime itself.115
Of course, the legitimacy of many low-level offenses—meaning
whether they are logically connected to the presuppositions underlying the
liberal, democratic project—is a complicated question. The public order
crimes that Bowers wants to run by normative grand juries116 could go either
way. On the one hand, they seek to instill baseline order, a primary objective
of liberal politics and retributive justice itself. On the other hand, some of
these crimes do seem rather “dumb,” to quote one commentator.117 And
given recent statistics showing that prosecution of such crimes may not
actually enhance public safety, and might actually breed future crime,118
their ability to re-instill the order so desired by retribution seems
questionable.
In sum, many collateral consequences have a blameworthiness problem.
They are imposed after arrest or prosecution for crimes that are lower, or
even questionably on the blameworthiness scale at all, however calculated.
The social realities behind these prosecutions add another layer to the
calculation; their initiation can stem from over-policing. Plea bargains
resulting in convictions do not always reflect blameworthiness,119 and legal
guilt may not match factual guilt, meaning existing collateral consequences
are not properly calibrated.120 And over-inclusive statutory language runs
the risk of making blameworthiness about group identity—all of those who
commit a crime have the same quantum of blameworthiness—irrespective
115
Markel, Retributive Justice, supra note 76, at 15. Interestingly, this ends up sounding a lot like
strict Kantian retributivism.
116
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319,
319 (2012).
117
Markel, Retributive Justice, supra note 76, at 39–40.
118
Michael Tonry, Punishment and Human Dignity: Sentencing Principles for Twenty-First
Century America, 47 CRIME & JUST. 119, 134 (2018) (“[A]n empirically grounded argument can be made
that prior convictions should mitigate rather than aggravate punishments for subsequent crimes.
Collateral social and legal effects of convictions make it foreseeably more difficult for former offenders
than non-offenders to live law-abiding lives.”).
119
Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 861 (2019).
120
Anna Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at
33–34) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3389597).
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of the circumstances underlying the crime and the prosecution. As such,
blameworthiness as a constraint on punishment is lost in the shuffle.
C. Proportionality
Moving from the justification side of retribution to the distributive side
reveals proportionality concerns for many collateral consequences. The
reality is that these consequences, for the most part, occur after the direct
sentence, however defined, is complete (or while it is ongoing, in the case
of probation or parole). Because many of these consequences are then extra
acts of coercion by the state in response to crime, they have the potential to
disrupt the equilibrium sought by the direct sentence, especially if they are
not coordinated with the direct sentence. In a word, they might end up being
disproportionate.121
1. Generally
The lack of proportionality seems to have three components: duration,
over-inclusivity, and status-based harm. First, collateral consequences are
often of exceedingly long duration—either by design or due to the inability
of the offender to move beyond them for some reason or another.
Restrictions on the books involve bans for significant amounts of years, and
sometimes even a lifetime. Offenders might be ineligible for benefits for half
a decade, unable to obtain loans for a stretch of time, or disallowed from
pursuing a license of some sort.122 Recently, revisions to expungement codes
and the opportunity to obtain certificates of relief have responded to this
reality.123
Proportionality also goes in the other direction, given that many
collateral consequences are grossly over-inclusive. Despite the nature of the
crime, whether minor or major, the same result might occur. For example,
low-level felons might lose the right to vote in the same fashion as the serial

121

See Jain, Misdemeanor Myths, supra note 107, at 977 (“From a retributivist perspective, the
criminal sanction is meant to be the sum total of the punishment. Yet, with misdemeanors, the formal
sanction is just one aspect of the harm. Even low-level penalties risk imposing far more harm than is
retributively justified, given the impact of the record.” (footnote omitted)); Torti, supra note 47, at 1937
(“Collateral consequences should be considered part of the punishment during proportionality analysis
because they dramatically affect its severity.”).
122
The sad story of Dwyane Betts, Yale law grad unable to immediately gain admission to the bar
because of his felony conviction and time-served, is just one example. See Vinny Vella, State Bar
Committee Approves Jail-to-Yale Lawyer, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 29, 2017, 2:15 PM),
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-dwayne-betts-approved-20170929-story.html
(discussing how the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee gave Dwayne Betts’s application pause
because of his criminal history).
123
See generally Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent
Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2016) (evaluating state
laws governing expungement).
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murderer, and the drug possessor might be evicted in the same fashion as the
kingpin.124 A more complex spectrum of proportionality could exist.
There is still another reason retributivists might consider collateral
consequences disproportionate: they result in undue shame given their
ability to inflict ongoing status harm. While shame itself may not undermine
retributive justice, excessive shame or misplaced shame could.125 As
mentioned in Part I, the incapacitative theory underlying many collateral
consequences essentially identifies an individual as a bad actor.126 This
immediately goes beyond the dictates of the consequences of one act. This
is why some label them status penalties. The status, usually confirmed by a
public criminal record that cannot be erased,127 involves perpetual shame,
amongst other disabilities.128 Although not perfectly analogous, this is
similar to the recidivist premium problem faced by retributivists.
At first blush, shame might seem consonant with retributive justice
given that it connotes moral blame. Indeed, moral desert impliedly involves
shame because punishment is warranted in order to reorient the offender
after his or her claim to legal superiority. Retribution communicates that one
should feel ashamed at disrupting the social order. But a closer look
demonstrates that shame run amok—confirmed in second-class legal status
for an extended period of time, and after a direct sentence—brings
punishment closer to vengeance than retribution. This is because punishment
built on perpetual or enduring shame undermines human dignity and
perverts the relationship between the community, state, and individual.129
Shaming too much through a collateral consequence inhibits the offender,
an equal citizen after the direct sentence, from moving beyond the initial
“retributive confrontation.”130 Furthermore, it caters to emotions in the
community, which can be disruptive in their own right. It can breed a cycle
that lends itself to private infliction of harm.

124
Travis, supra note 6, at 35; LaFollette, supra note 105, at 245 (“[T]he recreational user receives
only a slightly smaller penalty than a dealer.”).
125
See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 87, at 2172 (quoting Stephen P. Garvey, Can
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 737 (1998)) (“What makes something a shaming
punishment is that the penalty ‘expose[s] the offender to public view and heap[s] ignominy upon him in
a way that other alternative sanctions to imprisonment, like fines and community service, do not.’”).
126
See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, supra note 58, at 949 (referencing how banishment
measures devalue offenders and mark them as worthy of exclusion).
127
See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 87, at 2172 (discussing the permanence of online
criminal records).
128
See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, supra note 58, at 949 (“Banishment’s significance
is that it tracks this exclusionary aspect of punishment . . . and says to all: ‘There is something wrong
with this offender—not just with what he has done but with the kind of person he is—that makes him
morally unfit or simply too dangerous to live among law-abiding people.’”).
129
See id. (“[B]anishment is for people society has given up on.”).
130
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 87, at 2221.
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Indeed, the latter point has arguably been an unintended consequence of
the Ban the Box movement, which is a policy commitment designed to
straddle the line between state and community enforcement of
punishment.131 In some respects, Ban the Box has simply shifted the
infliction of punishment to non-state actors, who use race as a proxy for
criminality. Unfortunately, some studies show that private employers have
had no problem continuing to inflict harms on the community the initiative
is designed to protect.132 In other words, community actors have continued
to shame ex-offenders beyond the original sentence, running up against
traditional notions of proportionality and the sole responsibilities of the state.
2. Constitutional Considerations
Concerns about proportionality also may implicate constitutional norms.
A closer look at the meaning of proportionality within the Eighth
Amendment indicates the stakes. The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”133 While the question of whether the Eighth
Amendment contains a proportionality limitation is controversial,134 the
Supreme Court has ruled that application of an otherwise permissible
punishment is excessive or disproportionate in particular contexts.135
Assuming that remains the case, then examining how the last clause of the
Eighth Amendment might conceive of some collateral consequences is
131
Ban the Box is a campaign aimed at the removal of questions about criminal history on hiring
applications. BAN THE BOX CAMPAIGN, https://bantheboxcampaign.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
132
Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring
Ex-Offenders, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 371, 396–97 (2008).
133
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
134
For example, the late Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have questioned whether the Eighth
Amendment contains a proportionality restriction. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating his belief that “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth
Amendment only refers to “modes of punishment”). Justice White’s dissent in Weems v. United States
was similar. 217 U.S. 349, 382, 385 (1910) (White, J., dissenting); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R.
Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1517 n.183 (2001) (“Justices and scholars continue
to disagree as to whether the Framers . . . had proportionality in mind.”). As Youngjae Lee has argued,
the Court has held that since Weems some measure of proportionality, in both capital and non-capital
contexts, has existed within the Eighth Amendment. Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against
Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 679–81 (2005).
135
See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12 (holding that a longer sentence was appropriate because prior
strikes were for “serious felonies”); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003) (holding that a sentence
of two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life was deemed an appropriate punishment for petty
theft due to California’s three-strikes law); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment prevented the execution of criminals with mental disabilities because such a
punishment is cruel and unusual); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321 (1998) (holding that
the forfeiture of a large sum of currency was improper because the government’s ability to collect it was
limited by the Excessive Fines Clause); Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (holding that a fifteen-year prison
sentence was cruel and unusual because the sentence involved forced, painful labor). For a detailed
analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, see Youngjae Lee, Why Proportionality Matters,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1840–51 (2012).
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significant, especially if the Eighth Amendment contemplates a retributive
notion of proportionality.136
Although some might argue that the Supreme Court’s current
proportionality doctrine suggests otherwise, there is reason to believe that
retributive justice is worth considering. Youngjae Lee has argued that the
Supreme Court’s holdings, suggesting that a punishment cannot be
excessive as long as at least one theory of punishment can serve as the
rationale behind the measure, misunderstand the proportionality guarantee
within the Eighth Amendment.137 “Excessiveness” at the time of the
Founding was defined in relation to justice, implying that “justice” had
boundaries.138 That definition arose in a political context deeply concerned
with limiting the power of the state.139 It was also a context when the state
was viewed as the sole punisher.140 The history behind the constitutional
prohibition also suggests a concern with punishments beyond the direct
sentence, such as fines.141 That accords with the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Timbs v. Indiana,142 which traced proportionality back to the
Magna Carta.
In this sense, the constitutional norm grew out of the retributivist
concern about punishment not exceeding the gravity of the crime.143 Some
have emphasized the “fittingness” of punishment, which has roots in Joel
Feinberg’s theory of the expressive functions of punishment.144 A
punishment “fits” if it expresses the society’s condemnatory attitude toward
the criminal conduct, as long as it does not detract from the significance of
that suffering applied in other contexts.145 A punishment does not fit if it
undermines the seriousness of the punishment for other offenses.146 This also
136
See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 925 (noting how the Supreme
Court, by embracing a mistaken notion of proportionality review, has restricted review to .001% of
cases); Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 101, 101 (2008).
137
Lee, supra note 134, at 683.
138
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 914–15.
139
Id. at 928 (“[Proportionality] played a direct role in constitutional struggles to limit the power
of the sovereign . . . .”).
140
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (“[T]he prohibition of the 8th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution against excessive fines operates to control the legislation of the
states.”).
141
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 931.
142
139 S. Ct. 682, 695 (2019) (noting how, in colonial times, fines were viewed as punishment).
143
Lee, Excessive Punishment, supra note 134, at 683. As Lee carefully points out, this
understanding of proportionality does not touch the antecedent issue that allows legislatures to determine
which goals to pursue. It merely restrains the legislature in the pursuit. Id.
144
Id. at 709 (citing Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970)).
145
Id. at 709.
146
Id. (citing Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 100, 114 (1970)) (“[A] corollary to this is that not every
form of suffering or loss is an acceptable form of punishment in every society, depending on the symbolic
significance the particular form of suffering or loss has in the society.”).
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resembles reconstructive theories of criminal punishment.147 The degree of
condemnation must be calibrated properly to blameworthiness and the
gravity of the offense. While a utilitarian theory of proportionality can be
built from basic utilitarian premises, its results depend significantly on the
probability of detection and conviction, which are difficult to ascertain and
could lead to divergent results.148 A retributivist understanding of
proportionality within the Eighth Amendment suggests that otherwise
justifiable punishment is not acceptable if it would be cruel and unusual in
a particular context.
The meanings of the words in the Eighth Amendment support the idea
that retributive proportionality concerns about punishments are legitimate.
As John Stinneford has demonstrated, “[p]unishments are unconstitutionally
excessive if they are harsher than the defendant deserves as a retributive
matter,” and “proportionality should be measured primarily in relation to
prior punishment practice.”149 This stems from the text of the Amendment
itself, which suggests that the focus is not on whether a punishment is “cruel
and rare,” but on whether the punishment is “cruel and new.”150 Cruelty
refers to the effect of the punishment rather than its intent,151 meaning a
punishment that is inconsistent with longstanding prior punishment practice
and results in heightened suffering implicates the Eighth Amendment.152
As Stinneford points out, the “unusual” nature of a punishment was
understood with reference to the common law, which operated as a check on
the state.153 This motivated proponents of the Bill of Rights at the time of
the Founding.154 If a punishment was “contrary to long usage,” it would be
considered excessive.155 “Contrary to long usage” meant beyond the
147

See Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 31, at 1543–44 (discussing origins of
reconstructivism, which emphasizes socio-moral functions of the criminal law).
148
Lee, Excessive Punishment, supra note 134, at 738–39 (outlining how a utilitarian theory of
proportionality is possible but also likely to lead to unacceptable results). In particular, Lee notes that
while the Supreme Court has held that life imprisonment for a parking ticket would be unconstitutionally
excessive, a utilitarian argument could be made to justify the practice. Id. at 740 (“[I]n situations where
a particular type of crime that is extremely difficult to detect is causing a lot of damage, a well-publicized
punishment is considered a reliable device to induce deterrence, and the difficulty of detection is so
extreme that . . . the utilitarian theory may justify punishing an innocent person with an extreme
sanction.”).
149
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 899.
150
Id. at 907 (suggesting that the Eighth Amendment is designed to protect criminal offenders
“when the government’s desire to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly enflamed”).
151
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 441, 444–45 (2017).
152
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 909.
153
Id. at 942.
154
See id. at 944 (noting that George Mason and Patrick Henry were concerned about congressional
abrogation of the common law).
155
See id. at 942 (noting how “[v]irtually every case interpreting the . . . Clause or an analogous
state provision between 1791 and 1865 read the Clause to contain [a] prohibition” on excessive
punishments).
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boundaries of the common law tradition.156 Early courts used this as the
standard when judging punishments, especially when they implicated
traditional rights.157 The primary concern was that heightened state hostility
to criminal offenders in response to some event, societal panic, or other
outcry, would manifest through increasing the severity of punishments. 158
That sounds like the tough on crime era dominated by incapacitative logic.
What does this mean for collateral consequences? It suggests that many
deserve a second look in terms of whether they are consistent with the harms
inflicted by the state after the direct sentence in earlier eras. This
understanding of proportionality within the Eighth Amendment will not,
itself, blow a hole through the prevailing collateral consequences regime. It
does ask, however, whether existing collateral consequences had analogues
at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified and initially interpreted, how
they were imposed, and for which offenses. And while American
jurisdictions did bring collateral restrictions from Europe, they were mostly
related to historical antecedents, like the categorical punishments of infamy
or outlawry.159 It was not until the regulatory state that collateral
consequences touched nearly every facet of life.160
The same analysis is relevant in the era immediately preceding the
present. Some collateral consequences might be labeled “contrary to long
usage” because they have been extended to less serious offenses than they
were originally intended for,161 and others might be considered entirely new
and without precedent. The complicated array of restrictions that exists
nowadays is, for the most part, new, given the growth of civil law into a
number of aspects of life.162 And the incapacitative logic underlying them
could conflict with the Court’s statements about how incapacitation cannot
156

Id. at 949.
Id. at 968–69.
158
See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, supra note 58, at 1021 (“[C]onfronted by a massive
crime wave, Americans reached into their culture for ideas with which to understand what was going on
and decide how to respond. They grabbed hold of the concept of evil and also grabbed hold of the
instrumental approach.”).
159
Alessandro Corda, The Collateral Consequence Conundrum: Comparative Genealogy, Current
Trends, and Future Scenarios, 77 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 69, 72–76 (2018) (describing how American
jurisdictions adopted European approaches to collateral consequences, which were built on earlier
historical antecedents that conceived of them as limited punishments).
160
Id.
161
As Bill Stuntz argued, there are incentives built into the American system of criminal justice
that lead to the expansion of the reach of the criminal law. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519–23 (2001).
162
For example, sex offender registries are a relatively new phenomenon, as are certain categorical
bans in employment, or measures relating to eligibility for public benefits. See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell,
The Quasi-Criminality Revolution, 85 UMKC L. REV. 311, 316–18 (2017) (discussing the features of
quasi-criminal proceedings impacting liberty and their outgrowth from a culture of control). Of course,
analysis of a particular collateral consequence would require considering whether its goals were achieved
by other types of measures prior to the onset of the administrative state.
157
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override proportionality analysis.163 In short, the Court has intimated that
incapacitation or deterrence cannot be reason alone to uphold certain
punishments, implying a retributive ceiling.164
But that is not the end of the analysis under the Eighth Amendment,
which still requires that the punishment not be “cruel.” A cruel punishment
is one that is inconsistent with prior practice and not calibrated to
blameworthiness.165 Hence, the crucial question is “whether some change in
circumstances relevant to the offender’s culpability justifies an increase in
the harshness of [the] punishment” for altogether similar crimes.166 Given
that the collateral consequences state was not the fault of offenders, and its
expansiveness is almost entirely a post-1970s phenomenon, it is hard to see
how many collateral consequences would not be labeled cruel under this
definition.
This understanding of proportionality within the Eighth Amendment,
which Stinneford has persuasively argued for and applied to existing
Supreme Court jurisprudence on proportionality review,167 provides a
glimmer of hope for challenges to some of the most egregious collateral
consequences. Collateral consequences that exacerbate severe harm beyond
prior practice would be suspect because they result in unjust suffering.168
That seems especially so when the punishment is not transparent to the
average citizen.169 Given the Court’s recent willingness to entertain their
significance, the time is ripe for more constitutional connections to be
explored.170
163
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010) (“Incapacitation cannot override all other
considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”).
164
Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, supra note 135, at 1849.
165
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 972–73.
166
Id. at 972.
167
See id. at 976 (“Prior to 1978, there was no mandatory minimum punishment for the crime [first
time offense for possession with intent to distribute cocaine] in Michigan, and the maximum punishment
available for the crime was twenty years. No other state’s sentencing statute required a mandatory
minimum sentence of more than fifteen years, and federal law required a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years imprisonment.” (footnotes omitted)). A similar analysis might be conducted in relation to
the slate of collateral consequences faced by low-level, misdemeanor offenders today.
168
Stinneford, Original Meaning, supra note 151, at 447 (“When a given punishment is challenged
as cruel and unusual, the question is not whether it inflicts pain that is unduly harsh as an abstract and
absolute matter, but rather whether it inflicts pain that is unduly harsh in comparison to the traditional
punishments it has replaced.”).
169
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 155 (2d prtg. 2002) (noting
how non-public punishment would probably have been viewed as tyrannical in earlier American eras).
170
For example, last term the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of deference to
administrative agencies when it comes to interpreting sexual offender registry statutes, as well as the
concept of excessive fines. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019); Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019). That comes on the heels of a decade of acknowledging the significance of
collateral consequences, most notably in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). Fusion of Padilla
and other similar cases with a revised but more historical understanding of the Eighth Amendment leaves
room for consideration of a number of collateral consequences. As Stinneford puts it, “a focus on prior
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With all of the above said, the Eighth Amendment, in the short term, is
unlikely to serve as a sharp sword to challenge collateral consequences for
two reasons: (1) current doctrine defers greatly to legislatures; and (2) some
collateral consequences, like disenfranchisement or loss of a license, have
historical precedent. In short, constitutional proportionality analysis, even if
it assumes retributive premises, is not a panacea for reforming the collateral
consequences regime. Rather, the bulk of the work will still fall on
legislatures and policymakers to recognize that the risk of collateral
consequences running amok is greater when retributivist concerns, like
proportionality, are ignored or relegated to the sidelines.171 This Article calls
on legislatures to think more clearly about how collateral consequences
relate to the retributivist limits within their existing state codes172 and how
they are being reiterated by the judiciary, and whether they have any
connection to historical practices. In short, legislatures need to take seriously
the retributivist constraints they have built into their codes when considering
the propriety of collateral consequences.173
D. Plea-Bargaining Realities
As mentioned above, most prosecutions involve misdemeanor and
low-level order-maintenance crimes. The overwhelming majority of these
prosecutions end via plea deals.174 The Court in the past decade has reiterated
this systemic reality and developed its plea-bargaining jurisprudence. Most
notably, in Padilla v. Kentucky,175 Lafler v. Cooper,176 and Missouri v.
Frye,177 the Court has discussed the importance of notice of extraneous
consequences of plea deals, and expressed a desire to mitigate coercion.
These concerns accord with the communicative components of retributive
justice, as well as proportionality.
For example, some defendants plead to crimes that they did not commit,
and for a variety of reasons.178 Legal and factual guilt, as reported, diverge.
practice would significantly increase the scope of protection the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
provides to criminal offenders generally.” Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 977.
171
Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, supra note 135, at 1851 (noting how ambiguities relating to
proportionality analysis weigh in favor of expecting legislatures to make determinations).
172
See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra 26, at 5–7 (noting how many states recognize retributivist
restraints within their existing code).
173
See infra Part III.A (discussing systemic implications with a focus on legislatures, desert, and
collateral consequences).
174
Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the “Bazaar” of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2012, at A12 (noting that ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state
convictions result from plea deals).
175
559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
176
566 U.S. 156, 157 (2012).
177
566 U.S. 134, 135 (2012).
178
See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017) (describing how pre-trial detention
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But the collateral consequences could be harsher for the crime pled to than
the crime committed. This, coupled with concerns about notice and coercion,
could result in an offender’s unjustified placement in a group that is
punished by a particular collateral consequence that is disproportionate to
the punishment for the actual crime committed. This certainly occurs when
prosecutors adopt policies that treat all charges similarly in terms of plea
bargaining. The result is that the defendant gets punished for group identity
assigned by the charge, not desert connected to the committed acts.179
Another relevant consideration is that plea-bargaining undoubtedly
saves the system serious costs and communicates that the defendant is not
persisting in the rightness of the wrongdoing. A defendant’s decision to
plead guilty results in less disruption overall, in both a moral and practical
sense. The defendant accepts responsibility, thereby refraining from
persistence about the rightness of the wrongdoing. In a sense, the defendant
has retracted the initial representation that the defendant was above the law.
Yet the imposition of collateral consequences post-plea would seem to cut
the other way, such that the defendant’s decision to limit the number of
resources required by the state to prosecute actually results in more
punishment. The retributivist must confront whether acceptance of
responsibility by the defendant has implications for how much punishment
should occur, or at least the nature of the punishment. Here, the relationship
between forgiveness and justice is significant.
A defendant’s decision to plead guilty results in fewer costs for the
system. In misdemeanor or low-level prosecutions where counsel is not
immediately required, the lack of public lawyer staffing certainly leads to
fewer costs. But even in more complicated cases that result in guilty pleas,
the fact that the state does not have to proceed to trial, which necessarily
entails significant quantities of pre-trial work inside and outside of
courtrooms, means fewer costs. Nevertheless, these bargains can result in
the same or worse collateral consequences for those who plead out. In some
instances, prosecutors might seek to enforce otherwise discretionary
collateral consequences. This would seem to invert the punishment calculus
on the mind of some retributivists. The punishment should be calibrated to
the amount of disruption caused by the offender. But an offender’s decision
to accept responsibility and release the state from having to prove the
disruption could mean the defendant has decided to collaborate in the
restorative retribution.180 Arguably, it should mitigate the quantity of desert.
can result in more guilty pleas); Charles E. Loeffler, Jordan Hyatt & Greg Ridgeway, Measuring
Self-Reported Wrongful Convictions Among Prisoners, 35 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 259, 272–79
(2018) (providing findings from a study regarding wrongful convictions and guilty pleas).
179
Sidhu, supra note 15, at 707–08.
180
“Could” is a necessary qualification here because the motivation behind the plea determines
whether the defendant is participating in the restoration aimed for by retributive justice.
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In fairness, a critical response might suggest that a defendant’s
cooperation does not alter the initial desert basis. But that simply means that
the relationship between forgiveness and retributive justice might be
implicated.181 One concern is that forgiveness or mercy undercuts retributive
justice by violating the equalized liberty desired by retribution. But a
defendant’s acceptance of his or her wrongdoing allows for a distinction
between the offender and the act itself.182 This is because the offender is then
joining the community’s disapproval of the act, such that forgiveness by the
community no longer unequivocally communicates leniency. In other
words, accepting one’s guilt—by pleading guilty—ensures that the original
endorsement by the wrongdoer of the wrongdoing has been retracted. The
offender seems to “get it.” The community can then “join the wrongdoer in
condemning the very act from which he now stands emotionally
separated.”183 The plea begins the process of restoration built into
retribution. The road to equilibrium, by starting with the offender, means the
community is not getting hoodwinked. The offender’s will is already in the
process of correction. This internalized blame by the offender then requires
less external punishment. In this sense, retribution would seem to allow for
the exercise of mercy or forgiveness, although it might not be required,
depending on the circumstances.184 At the very least, this approach counters
the incapacitative logic that assigns dangerousness based on group identity
rather than careful scrutiny of the act and actor’s blameworthiness.
Of course, that also leads to a separate question. Who comprises the
community of actors mentioned previously? In other words, it could be the
case that while the retributivist can concede that a defendant’s plea factors
into the type of punishment, what really is at stake is who should be
restrained from inflicting the collateral consequence. Although retribution
operates to constrain communal resentment at the offender, it does not
necessarily follow that forgiveness or mercy must be a state act. The state

181
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3,
6 (1988).
182
Id. (“But to the extent that the agent separates himself from his evil act, then to that extent
forgiveness of him is possible without a tacit approval of his evil act.”).
183
Id. at 7 (“But what if they come to separate themselves from their own evil act? Then the
insulting message is no longer present—no longer endorsed by the wrongdoer. We can then join the
wrongdoer in condemning the very act from which he now stands emotionally separated. Thus to the
degree that the agent can be divorced from his evil act, forgiveness is possible without lack of
self-respect.”).
184
Others have written about this complicated relationship, noting how mercy might be considered
necessary, in some instances, to perfect imperfect “legal justice.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and
Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 93, 97 (1993). It is important to realize that the richness of mercy as a
moral and social concept stems from its connection to the dictates of desert rather than utilitarian
calculations.
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could still inflict direct desert. Private, non-official actors could then be
tasked with exercising mercy or forgiveness.185
E. Restoration and Communal Responsibility
Recall that retribution aims for the restoration of a baseline moral and
political situation through imposition of what the offender deserved. This
theme is present in some strands of retributivism more than others, and can
closely align with what other scholars have labeled reconstructivism.186
Given the amount of power that the government possesses, especially to
brand offenders with lifelong stigma, the state must be careful to preserve
legitimacy when exacting punishment.187 Retributivism holds that the state
is the only legitimate punisher, meaning private actors should not take the
law into their own hands.188 There are limits of state intervention and for
other actors within the wrongdoer’s community.189 If those actors
continuously inflict suffering after the original debt is paid, then the
damaged relationship between the offender and the community can persist
and the legitimacy of the state as a whole can be compromised.190 Thus,
important questions to ask about a collateral consequence are: (1) Will the
measure inhibit restoration or disrupt the social order?; (2) Is the
consequence necessary as part of the original desert?; and (3) Will the
measure leave room for private actors to exact extra punishment-like
suffering in a fashion that delegitimizes government’s role as the sole
punisher?191

185

Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, supra note 181, at 13 (“There is thus room for mercy as an
important moral virtue with impact upon the law, but it is a virtue to be manifested by private persons
using the law—not by officials enforcing the law.”).
186
See Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 31, at 1486 (discussing similarities between
retributivism and reconstructivism). Reconstructivism emphasizes the social function of the criminal
law’s ability to repair the moral culture, focusing on the solidarity between members of the community.
Some versions of retributivism, especially non-deontological desert-based theories, do the same, but
usually as byproduct of pursuit of imposing individual punishment. See Finnis, supra note 83, at 97
(discussing how retribution serves as functions for community).
187
Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, supra note 135, at 1838.
188
Id.
189
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF
PUNISHMENT 127 (2010) (arguing for a “laissez-faire” conception of state intervention); Lee, Why
Proportionality Matters, supra note 135, at 1839 (noting how the government, “as the exclusive agent of
punishment, . . . has dual commitments”). [AQ]
190
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 285–86 (2011)
(discussing crises of legitimacy).
191
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 18 (1988) (“A legal system is possible only if the state enjoys a monopoly of force. When private
individuals appeal to force and decide who shall enjoy the right to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness,’ there can be no pretense of the rule of law.”).
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There is no question that collateral consequences affect an offender’s
ability to act as a member of a political community.192 This relates directly
to the respect for individual agency and human dignity underlying
retribution. Many of these sanctions affect the ability to participate in
democratic processes, actualize constitutional rights, or move between
social situations.193 They tinker with freedom after the direct sentence that
was supposed to be calibrated to desert. Alec Ewald describes it like this:
[F]ormer prisoners under the weight of collateral sanctions
find that a relationship of basic political equality is replaced
by a line dividing full citizens (holding the power to govern)
from former offenders (who are merely governed). To the
extent that they cannot conduct autonomous economic life and
engage in political activities such as jury deliberation, military
service, and voting, it is not hyperbole to say they are
converted into objects.194
The retributivist must be concerned with how a collateral consequence
subverts the respect for individual accountability that underlies retributive
justice and is at the core of membership in a political community. In concrete
terms, that means the retributivist must demonstrate why a particular
collateral consequence that results in the loss of a benefit or otherwise
existing right correlates precisely to the proper desert.195 If collateral
consequences unjustifiably limit an ex-offender’s ability to act as a moral
agent capable of doing good or wrongdoing, it would seem the collateral
consequence has gone too far. What results is a division within society: those
that the law treats as moral-political actors and those that it does not. In a
liberal, democratic order like the United States, this concretely means an
altered citizenship status.196 But retribution, properly conceived, is not meant
to divide. Once desert has been achieved, the potentiality for individual
agency and accountability returns to the ex-offender. Put simply, retributive
justice does not hold that the ex-offender remains marked after punishment.
Ongoing punishment that is not justified would be conceived as wrongdoing
by the state.
192
Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, supra note 58, at 965–71 (discussing how some
collateral consequences, such as modern-day banishment, are primarily about citizenship).
193
Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt,
117 PA. ST. L. REV. 349, 370–72 (2012) (“[C]ivil sanctions are not collateral at all in at least one important
sense: they directly limit participation in critical areas of life as the result of a criminal conviction.”
(footnote omitted)).
194
Ewald, supra note 50, at 105–06.
195
LaFollette, supra note 105, at 244.
196
AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 1–30 (2014) (noting formal and informal effects of
collateral consequences on how citizens relate to the government).

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 368

7/28/20 10:48 AM

2020]

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

897

And that ongoing punishment has effects on the relationship between
the ex-offender and the community because it allows for persistent
resentment that has not been resolved. Retributive justice asks the state to
cease punishing once the threshold of restoration has been achieved.
Anything beyond that is flirting with permitting a dangerous walking of the
line between retribution and vengeance.
In other words, retributive justice assumes certain duties on the part of
the state and community after the justified punishment. Christopher Bennett
has made similar arguments, built from democratic values; they overlap with
the core premises of retributive justice relating to restoring the state of
equalized liberty that existed prior to wrongdoing.197 As such, an expansive
collateral consequences regime might be criticized on both retributive and
democratic grounds.198
Where is the overlap? It lies in a deep understanding of community
duties that stem from the justification for punishment in the first place.
Because retributive justice contains built-in limiting principles, it
corresponds that those limiting principles imply certain duties not to go
overboard.199 It might be said that the community has duties to limit undue
harm to ex-offenders, assuming imposition of the direct sentence was
properly calibrated to what was deserved after the wrongdoing.200 This is
especially so given that stigma can be criminogenic.201
But frankly the discussion goes deeper than that. Recall that retributive
justice presumes a relationship between the offender and the broader
community.202 This is the case whether a moral or political-legal retributivist
is doing the punishing. Relationships are ongoing. They are a social reality.
They are between actors with agency and dignity. The state’s relationship
and corresponding duties do not cease once desert is satisfied. Bennett calls
this relationship “special,”203 and it would seem that retributive theories hold

197
Christopher Bennett, Invisible Punishment Is Wrong – But Why: The Normative Basis of
Criticism of Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 56 HOW. J. CRIME & JUST. 480, 482 (2017)
(arguing that responsibilities toward those with collateral consequences stem from the fact that the
community is comprised of “fellow participants in a collective democratic enterprise”).
198
Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment, supra note 136, at 113 (“There is a difference between
giving people what they deserve and stripping them of their citizenship . . . .”).
199
Bennett, supra note 197, at 486 (“Those who punish are not morally free to do anything they
like to the offender.”).
200
Id. at 487 (“They are, therefore, violating duties to limit harm to offenders, and acting as though
they had a morally free hand.”).
201
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 42–43 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984); JOHN
BRATHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 16–21 (1989).
202
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 87, at 2191.
203
Bennett, supra note 197, at 488.
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the same, as most locate the state as the only proper punisher in order to
avoid revenge or vengeance.204
If retributive justice implies a special relationship between the state,
community, and offender, which continues after retribution, then what are
the parameters of those relationships? For the state, the starting point must
be the attempted maintenance of the equilibrium previously disrupted,
cognizant of the presumed individual agency of the actors within the
community. That suggests that collateral consequences that are
criminogenic might be problematic.205 It also suggests that punishment that
exceeds culpability is actually punishment given in the absence of
culpability—which also implicates the Eighth Amendment.206 At the same
time, it also leaves open the possibility that some collateral consequences
might be necessary components of a justified punishment, something this
Article does not dispute.207
As for individual actors within the community, as distinguished from
the official state, the answer might lie in a concept of associational duties.208
Retributive justice, by locating punishing authority in the state, limits what
individual community members can do in response to wrongdoing. These
limitations suggest at least a duty not to inflict additional punishment. It is
not clear that a positive duty to restore falls into the lap of the fellow citizen,
although perhaps an argument can be made.209 But the infliction of
additional punishment-like harms, even if formally allowed by the state,
would seem to go too far as it would result in additional disruption to the
order that was purportedly restored after the original punishment. Except
this time, it is not the ex-offender doing the disrupting. Call it statesanctioned disruption after state-inflicted punishment.210
204
R.A. Duff, Retrieving Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 3, 6–
7 (Mark D. White ed., 2011).
205
Amy L. Solomon, In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, 270 NAT’L
INST. JUST. J. 42, 44 (2012), https://www.nij.gov/journals/270/pages/criminal-records.aspx.
206
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 103, at 908.
207
As mentioned in my previous Article, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, I do not disagree
that retributivist principles can justify collateral consequences and that collateral consequences can
pursue desert. Murray, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 4. The thrust of the argument, fleshed
out here, is that desert, as a distributive principle, can lead to suspicion of collateral consequences.
208
Bennett locates these duties due to the social position of the ex-offender vis-à-vis his fellow
citizens. See Bennett, supra note 197, at 482.
209
See, e.g., PETER KARL KORITANSKY, THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT
193 (2012) (arguing that retributivism could lead to a deeper understanding of rehabilitation given that it
is concerned with justice rather than preventing crime).
210
In a liberal democratic state, this situation could be fragile given the autonomy of the nonoffending decision maker in relation to the ex-offender. For example, can the state tell an individual that
it cannot sanction an offender? This seems to hinge on whether individuals cede to the state the sole
authority to exact punishment. Even if the state’s role as punisher is primary but not absolute, the state
should be able to enact reasonable restrictions on the actions of individuals who are, in a sense, usurping
the state’s preeminence. After all, that seems part of the social and political contract, although I concede
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This type of disruption can have serious consequences that are anathema
to retributive justice. A disproportionate punishment that disrupts socially
and politically is particularly troubling given that it expands the reach of the
effects of criminal law beyond its intended boundaries.211 Retributive justice
is designed to prevent self-inflicted societal wounds after desert has been
achieved. In a democratic society, this means that punishment that results in
disrupted social and political equality, after desert restored it, undermines
the democratic principle of inclusion.212 The communicative aspect of
collateral consequences is then implicated. This is another reason why the
American retributivist should view an expansive collateral consequences
regime with skepticism.213
III. SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS
These principles have significant implications for several components
of the existing criminal system. This Section will highlight a few that
immediately come to mind, but this Section is by no means exhaustive. First,
it will provide examples of how retributive principles might assess some
well-known collateral consequences, discussing how legislatures might
view reform. Second, it demonstrates how these principles might affect
decisions made by retributivist decision makers. Third, it explains how these
principles might inform certain phases of the system where collateral
consequences frequently arise.
A. Legislatures, Desert, and Collateral Consequences
Although Part II references possible constitutional arguments that might
be aligned with retributive principles, most collateral consequences reform
remains the province of state legislatures.214 What should impel legislatures
to act?
that resolution of this issue is difficult given other aspects of the American constitutional framework,
such as the First Amendment. As such, this argument is geared more towards legislative action than
constitutional norms.
211
LaFollette, supra note 105, at 257 (noting how collateral consequences regimes can result in the
disenfranchisement of racial minorities); Bennett, supra note 197, at 492 (“[P]unishment regimes can
play a significant role in denying individuals the benefits of social membership to which they are due.”).
212
Bennett, supra note 197, at 493 (“For democracy’s ideal of equality means that a society that
aspires to be democratic cannot tolerate the idea of a semi-permanent body of second class citizens.”). A
criticism of this position might ask how collateral consequences should be understood with respect to
non-citizens. In my mind, the principles of retributive justice provide a stronger case for limiting such
consequences than the associational duties put forth by Bennett.
213
Bennett states, “[A] society cannot on the one hand claim to be democratic and on the other hand
deny its citizens what they need to be independent and active participants.” Id. at 494. Similarly, a
retributivist cannot on the one hand claim to be concerned with proportionate punishment, discharged by
the state, and then deny the properly punished a return to the order.
214
See ACLU et al., State Reforms Reducing Collateral Consequences for People with Criminal
Records: 2011-2012 Legislative Round-Up 1, 2, 19 (2012) https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
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Some states already conceive retributivist constraints as worthwhile.
This line of thinking returned after judicial rulings reinjected retributive
concepts into state sentencing regimes215 and due to the influence of the
Model Penal Code, which references desert as a limiting principle in the
sentencing context.216
While state legislatures followed the Model Penal Code in the
mid-twentieth century, expressly prioritizing crime prevention as the
purpose for punishment,217 the same legislatures either reversed course in
the 1980s or corresponding state courts interpreted reform statutes as open
to retributive principles.218 Michele Cotton has demonstrated how
legislatures adopted proportionality spectrums in the latter half of the
century.219 For example, Georgia, Oregon, Arkansas, Montana, North
Carolina, and Washington, following Illinois, adopted language that limited
punishment to “penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses . . . .”220 California prioritized retribution as “the” purpose for
punishment221 and Pennsylvania listed it as “primary” in 1982.222 Arizona,
North Dakota, Tennessee, Hawaii, and New York statutes referenced “just
deserts” as crucial to punishment.223 These provisions emphasized limiting
punishment based on the culpability of offenders and the degree of harm
caused.224 Both are fundamentally retributive concepts.
content/uploads/2016/01/State-Collateral-Consequences-Legislative-Roundup-2011-2012.pdf
(describing individual state measures to reform collateral consequences).
215
Cotton, supra note 62, at 1319.
216
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 8.
217
Cotton, supra note 62, at 1320 (referencing how the original Model Penal Code did not mention
retribution).
218
Id. at 1323 (noting how the Model Penal Code equivocated on whether retribution was a purpose
of punishment).
219
Id. at 1332.
220
Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-2(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-629)).
221
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
222
204 PA. CODE § 303.11(a) (2019) (referencing “a primary focus on retribution”).
223
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-101(6) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“To
impose just and deserved punishment” (emphasis added)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-02(3) (West,
Westlaw through 202 legislation) (noting how provisions of the title are intended to “prescribe penalties
which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses” (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-35-102(1) (West, Westlaw through First Extraordinary 2019 Legis. Sess.) (referencing “justly
deserved” sentences); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(directing courts to consider the seriousness of the offense “to provide just punishment”); N.Y. PENAL §
1.05(5) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019 c.752) (seemingly referencing harm caused when referring
to “the consequences of the offense for the victim”).
224
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(referencing “the nature and extent of the harm caused” and factors that might diminish the offender’s
culpability); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.12 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (stating
that a primary purpose of sentencing is to impose a punishment “commensurate with the injury the
offense has caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the offender’s culpability”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-101(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (referencing “nature and
degree of harm caused”).
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States who take such principles seriously must consider how the punitive
nature of collateral consequences implicates retributive constraints. Resting
on formalist classifications—which current judicial doctrine allows for the
most part—allows legislatures and courts to shirk responsibility as the sole
authority responsible for determining just punishment.
To be clear, legislatures do not need to abandon utilitarian principles
when assessing the propriety of collateral consequences. In fact, many
continue to retain utilitarian metrics, again following the Model Penal
Code.225 But retributive distributive principles can serve as an additional tool
for assessing whether a particular collateral consequence is appropriate or
not. The constitutional system leaves to legislatures the decision whether to
pursue desert or deterrence, or some other goal. But if a legislature states it
is pursuing desert, or prioritizing it, then it should carefully scrutinize
legislatively enacted collateral consequences according to the parameters of
retributive justice in the jurisdiction.
B. Retributivism and Specific Collateral Consequences
How might this approach work for some specific, well-known collateral
consequences? First, as mentioned earlier, most existing collateral
consequences find their justification after the following question is posed:
will this consequence keep others safe or prevent crime? If restraint can be
rationalized, the consequence is presumptively permissible. The approach
advocated in this Article steers in a different direction, instead asking: is this
sanction deserved by those who commit the crime at issue?
Because desert implicates the distributive principles mentioned above,
any collateral consequence would need to be precisely correlated to
blameworthiness and be proportionate. It would also need to relate to the
restoration at the core of retributivism, going no further than necessary to
disrupt social order. In a democratic society, that suggests presumptive
limits on the state, especially if direct, carceral sentences remain the norm.
Of course, many collateral consequences could be justified, and might even
do a better job than traditional methods of punishment—such as
incarceration or probation—in accomplishing this objective.226
There are a few well-known collateral consequences that have received
plenty of attention recently. Two include: (1) felon disenfranchisement; and
(2) occupational license denials. This Section interprets these collateral
consequences in light of the principles mentioned above.

225
Cotton, supra note 62, at 1325–35 (discussing the many states that retained utilitarian purposes
in addition to reviving retributive principles).
226
For example, a short-term license denial might be a more appropriate punishment than several
months incarceration for a mid-level offense, although it would be fact-specific.
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1. Disenfranchisement
There is perhaps no collateral consequence—other than immigration—
more in the news than felon disenfranchisement, a practice with a long
history and constitutional permission.227 Approximately six million
Americans are banned from voting.228 Florida recently passed a
constitutional amendment, by a large margin, restoring the right to vote to
over 1.5 million members of the state’s population.229 While that political
result is somewhat unique and considered a resounding victory by many
criminal justice reformers, it also was considered troubling by others
elsewhere on the political spectrum.230
Felon disenfranchisement has a long history231 and has been deemed
within the authority of the states given the Fourteenth Amendment’s specific
enforcement provisions.232 Measures have involved short-term and lifetime
bans.233 For example, in Florida, a lifetime ban ensued even if the felonies
committed involved conduct that would normally be classified on the
misdemeanor level by other jurisdictions.234 While state law allowed
restoration for some types of felonies, and after a significant waiting period,
several other states continue to retain measures like the initial ban that
existed in Florida.235 The fact that the felony label has been applied to
relatively minor crimes means that many more offenders potentially face the
loss of the right to vote. Only fourteen states automatically restore some civil
rights, including the right to vote, to felons.236
While current law does have a connection to historical practice, it bears
mentioning that early colonial laws tended to strip the franchise after serious
227
E.g., George Will, What Government Interest Is Served by Disenfranchising Felons?, NAT’L
REV. (Apr. 8, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/what-government-interest-isserved-by-disenfranchising-felons/.
228
Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENT’G PROJECT (June 27, 2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/ [hereinafter THE
SENTENCING PROJECT].
229
Janell Ross, Amendment 4 in Florida Restored Voting Rights to Felons. Now That’s Back in
Doubt., NBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/felon-votingrights-back-jeopardy-florida-n991146.
230
Roger Clegg & Hans A. von Spakovsky, There Are Good Reasons for Felons to Lose the Right
FOUND.
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.heritage.org/electionto
Vote,
HERITAGE
integrity/commentary/there-are-good-reasons-felons-lose-the-right-vote.
231
See ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 12–13 (2006) (contrasting
American disenfranchisement policies with those of other countries); 3 CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY
OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 54 (1893) (describing the grounds for disenfranchisement in
colonial New England).
232
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
233
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 228, at 1.
234
See Will, supra note 227 (discussing how Florida “has a low threshold for felonious acts,”
including driving without a license for the third time).
235
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 228, at 1.
236
Id.
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malum in se violations.237 Post-Revolution, states expanded the restriction
following the creation of more felony offenses.238 States continued to do so
after the Civil War.239 The Supreme Court upheld this practice after an Equal
Protection challenge, foreclosing many constitutional challenges.240 The
Eighth Amendment arguments above are also unlikely to apply across the
board given this long history.241 As such, any argument against felon
disenfranchisement must come from a policy rather than constitutional
perspective, meaning legislative action.
Interpretation of these laws suggest they are fundamentally utilitarian
and contractual, which perpetuates disagreement about classifying them as
punishment.242 One justification is that felons have shown that they cannot
comply with the law, and therefore they cannot be part of the process that
helps make the law.243 A breach of the social trust underlying the political
process has occurred, triggered by the conviction. Non-compliance in the
past serves as the basis for non-participation in the future, because otherwise
there will be no incentive for the same individual, or others, to comply in the
present. Additionally, offenders who vote might do so subversively, thereby
further undermining the law.244
Second, the commission of serious crimes, in the words of one court,
renders the offender “unfit.”245 Disenfranchisement, along these lines, is said
to keep the electoral process untainted.246 This has informed how restoration
of the franchise only occurs after proof that the person has not recidivated
or been a repeat offender.247 This is basic incapacitative logic at work,
237
Alec C. Ewald, Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in
the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1061.
238
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 228, at 3.
239
Id. See also Eli L. Levine, Note, Does the Social Contract Justify Felony Disenfranchisement?,
1 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 193, 196–201 (2009) (describing the history behind felon disenfranchisement).
240
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 25 (1974). But see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,
233 (1985) (suggesting disenfranchisement measures targeting individuals on the basis of race are
problematic).
241
For example, a third drunkenness conviction in Maryland resulted in the loss of voting privileges.
See ANDREW DILTS, PUNISHMENT AND INCLUSION: RACE, MEMBERSHIP, AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
LIBERALISM 144 (2014).
242
In other words, because utilitarian purposes for punishment can resemble utilitarian justifications
for regulation, the line between the criminal and civil is difficult to decipher.
243
See Mary Sigler, Defensible Disenfranchisement, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1725, 1729 (2014) (“[A]
‘man who breaks the laws . . . could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate
in further administering the compact.’” (quoting Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.
1967))); see also 148 CONG. REC. S802 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (arguing
that those who break the law lose the right to make the law).
244
Ewald, supra note 237, at 1073–74.
245
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884).
246
Sigler, supra note 243, at 1727.
247
Some states have processes for voting restoration. Many of these processes look at the length of
time since the offense, any prior offenses, and whether there are any current concerns about the offender
or accomplishments by the offender. See, e.g., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., 50-STATE
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suggesting first that participation by offenders will corrupt the process and
second that offenders might engage in additional illegal behavior, a claim
for which there is no proof.248 It is no secret that, as Mary Sigler argued, “[a]
common theme in historical exclusions of criminal offenders from civic life
is a concern that such persons will taint the body politic.”249 To be fair, Sigler
understood this line drawing as fundamentally civil because the breach of
the civic trust is doing the work, rather than a legislative desire to be
punitive. But that reduces the punishment label to only the intentions behind
the measure, rather than its nature and effects. That also would foreclose the
applicability of retributive principles. But incapacitative line-drawing
triggered by a conviction is fundamentally punitive given that the conviction
is linked to wrongdoing considered morally blameworthy, and
disenfranchisement resembles banishment-style isolation from the
political-social community that is served by the criminal law.250 In a word,
disenfranchisement based on conviction marks the condemned.
That last point would open the door to retributive concepts informing
discussion about felon disenfranchisement. What might that discussion
entail? First, concerns relating to blameworthiness could lead to suspicion
about blanket bans, especially those based on lower-level crimes labeled as
felonies. Given that low-level crimes do not always track normative guilt, or
are the result of harsh plea-bargaining, lifetime bans risk being
over-inclusive. Further, lifetime bans for crimes that are not egregious would
not only be considered inconsistent with prior historical practice, but also
disproportionate. The murderer and the low-level thief do not have the same
degree of blameworthiness even if the legislature labels both crimes a
felony.
Further, the effects on the individual and social restoration aimed for by
retributivism cannot be forgotten. Given that a felony conviction already
provides a scarlet letter, and in most states, a permanent one, how does
enlarging its size and constantly etching the stain not disrupt what was
supposed to be achieved via the direct sentence? The communicative nature
of the punishment belies the very notion of desert; after completing a
COMPARISON: LOSS AND RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & FIREARMS RIGHTS,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/chart-1-loss-and-restoration-of-civil-rights-andfirearms-privileges/ (last visited June 9, 2020) (highlighting voter restoration processes in the applicable
states).
248
George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899 (1999).
249
Sigler, supra note 243, at 1730.
250
Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, supra note 58, at 949. This is a key distinction between
my position and Sigler’s. Whereas Sigler would consider disenfranchisement regulatory because it relates
directly to a breach of the civic trust, I would say the breach of the civic trust is one reason why
punishment exists because the criminal law has a political-socio purpose by virtue of its connection to
shared moral and social norms. In other words, punishment is about maintenance of the social order, of
which voting is a part.
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sentence, a felon who complied with a sentence remains barred from the
political community purportedly served by the criminal law.
Of course, some disenfranchisement could be justified on desert-based
grounds. For example, a retributivist might argue that for some egregious
offenses, such as murder, the disruption caused by the offense was so grave
that allowing the offender to vote would actually counteract the desert.
Voting, in this regard, is taken away in order to illustrate the basic terms of
the social fabric and what can happen if they are disregarded.251 That is a
position consonant with the voters and decision makers who have supported
restoration efforts. Developed from these premises, disenfranchisement
could also, for some duration, be defended. Some crimes violate the
common political commitment underlying adherence to the criminal law,
meaning the offender must show re-commitment to that order before
regaining the ability to vote.252
But that is a far cry from applying permanent loss to individuals who
have committed far less egregious crimes and done nothing to reoffend.
Unconstrained disenfranchisement has the potential to re-disrupt the balance
restored by other punitive measures that exist in the wake of a conviction. In
other words, a retributive mindset rejects a complete commitment to the
us-them mentality underlying permanent disenfranchisement. This is
because retributive principles desire to communicate to the offender that a
return to the political community is a goal and an expectation. Because
desert is presumptively restrained, a time will come when the offender
should be restored. Notably, this aligns with a liberal constitutional order
that views class-based exile skeptically.253
In terms of practical administration, these principles suggest a strong
look at which offenses should trigger some temporary disenfranchisement,
for how long, and the processes required for restoration. A felony label,
alone, no longer guarantees that a particular crime is grave enough to limit
participation in the political community.254 Offenses that are particularly
serious would provide the strongest grounds when considering
blameworthiness and proportionality. Duration could also be linked to those
concepts, bearing in mind the periodic nature of elections.
As far as the processes for restoration, this is a key difference between
a retributive approach and a utilitarian one: the retributivist would likely
251

Mary Sigler applies similar logic in her article mentioned above, although from a civil,
regulatory background based on current doctrinal classifications by courts. See Sigler, supra note 243, at
1728 (referencing civic trust as underlying a regulatory approach to the franchise and emphasizing how
withholding voting heightens a sense of civic responsibility).
252
CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
165 (2008).
253
Sigler, supra note 243, at 1738–39.
254
Id. at 1741 (referencing crimes considered serious enough historically, such as “murder, rape,
arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and prison escape”).
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make that process simpler given that compliance with the law, during the
period of disenfranchisement that was calibrated to the desert, reinforces the
limits of such desert. That period might overlap with incarceration as well.
In other words, a desert-based approach would not, in most cases, be open
to extended disenfranchisement. On the contrary, the utilitarian would
consistently ask the offender to prove non-riskiness, casting its lot with
predictive indicators of future non-compliance with the law. This might take
the form of more onerous requirements that force the ex-offender to prove
worth. This is the existing reality in many states.255 The difference is
primarily about who shoulders the burden and whether restoration would be
presumptively obtainable. The retributivist approach begins to view
persistent disenfranchisement skeptically after the desert has been meted
out; the utilitarian approach views the offender skeptically until the offender
proves otherwise.
2. Occupational License Denials
Reform of occupational licensing restrictions represents an area where
legislatures have already incorporated some retributive-based principles.
These restrictions came about in the second half of the last century, although
some states reformed them relatively quickly, recognizing how they
adversely affected rehabilitative efforts.256 However, many of these laws
remained untouched for decades until reform-minded groups across the
political spectrum generated model legislation.257
Many occupational license restrictions prevented offenders from
obtaining licenses if they had committed crimes that were indicative of bad
character. These laws reference crimes of “moral turpitude,” or use
comparable labels.258 This statutory language resembles the
incapacitative-based line drawing that underlies many collateral
consequences. The idea is that commission of an offense indicates someone
is a bad person, not someone who committed a bad act.259 The character
judgment is about risk, not desert. Several state statutes indicate this logic
themselves. For example, Arizona allows denial of a license on public safety
255
HULL, supra note 231, at 6–8; JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74 (2006).
256
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR
CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018, at 17 n.7 (2019) (referencing enactments of laws that
limit the denial of employment opportunities in New Jersey, Colorado, Washington, Hawaii, Minnesota,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).
257
See id. at 7 (discussing legislation advanced by the Institute of Justice and the National
Employment Law Project).
258
See COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., LOSS AND RESTORATION, supra note 247
(describing the laws across all fifty states).
259
Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, supra note 58, at 943 (referencing how banishment
measures operate from the principle that the actor is akin to evil).

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 378

7/28/20 10:48 AM

2020]

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

907

grounds.260 Arkansas and Minnesota are examples of states that require the
petitioner to put forth evidence of rehabilitation.261 Maryland allows denials
when the offender “would [pose] unreasonable risk,”262 and New Hampshire
requires the licensing board to justify disqualification on the basis of public
safety.263
The model legislation put forth by the Institute of Justice (IJ) and the
National Employment Law Project (NELP) amplifies the aspects of criminal
justice that the retributivist should be most concerned about. For example,
both entities called for an emphasis on serious convictions, suggesting a
desert threshold. They abandon vague standards like “good moral
character.”264 Second, many states have eliminated the character-based
language referenced above, instead opting for requirements that the offense
in question have a direct relationship to the sought-after license.265 Notably,
this is an example of blameworthiness and proportionality principles helping
to narrowly tailor a licensing restriction.
For example, Connecticut now prohibits licensing authorities from
disqualifying a person automatically, requiring the agency to consider the
nature of the crime, how it relates to the job, information pertaining to
rehabilitation, and the time elapsed since conviction.266 The District of
Columbia has similar factors for public employment, including the person’s
age at the time of the offense.267 Missouri prevents denial of a license
“solely” on the basis of a conviction when the sentence has been fully
served.268 These factors relate directly to the blameworthiness of the
offender and the severity of the offense. They are expressions of
considerations relating to desert.
Further, states that have modified statutes to require a reasonable
relation between the offense and license or job sought269 are essentially
260

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1093.04(E) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-1-103(d) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN §
364.03(Subd. 3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 legislation); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-4(2)–(3)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (mentioning rehabilitation but not explicitly requiring evidence
of such).
262
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 1-209(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
263
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-G:13(b) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
264
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS, supra note 256, at 8.
265
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(declaring that offenses of “moral turpitude” alone cannot disqualify an applicant); see also COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., 50-STATE COMPARISON CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL RECORDS IN
LICENSING
AND
EMPLOYMENT,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-statecomparisoncomparison-of-criminal-records-in-licensing-and-employment/ (last visited June 9, 2020)
(identifying states with comparable statutes).
266
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(a)–(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
267
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-620.43 (West, Westlaw through 2019).
268
MO. ANN. STAT. § 324.029 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
269
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011(1)(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(stating that a person may be denied a job only where the crime is “directly related to the position of
261
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attempting to calibrate the restriction to a precise quantum of risk, mindful
of the initial degree of blameworthiness and proportionality. In other words,
requiring a direct connection between the offense and the license or position
amplifies blameworthiness and proportionality, limiting the potential for
over-inclusion stemming from the use of any conviction as a proxy for
riskiness. Some states, like Indiana, have supplemented these considerations
by identifying only a limited window of time during which the state can
actually intervene to restrict a license.270 Kansas has proposed legislation
that prevents less serious convictions from being considered after five years,
and non-conviction records cannot be considered at all.271 That is an obvious
example of the limitations of desert; once the state has punished, it cannot
punish anymore. These reforms illustrate the utility of using retributive
constraints to help cabin collateral consequences motivated by a desire for
incapacitation.
C. Retributivist-Minded Prosecutors
There are various decision makers at notable points within the criminal
system who might be retributively inclined. The prosecutor is front and
center.
Given that collateral consequences are often felt in the wake of charging
and bargaining,272 their persistence implicates the actions of prosecutors.
Others have highlighted the importance of prosecutorial discretion when it
comes to the imposition of collateral consequences following guilty pleas.273
And while many larger prosecutors’ offices—particularly in major
metropolitan areas—have made policy changes to guide front line
prosecutors, little attention has been paid to the penal attitudes of front-line
prosecutors and how they might inform thinking with respect to collateral

employment sought” and denied a license where the crime is “directly related to the standards” for
determining whether a license is appropriate); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1-19(q) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Reg. Sess.) (proposing legislation requiring that no individual be denied a license on the basis of a
prior felony or crime involving moral turpitude unless there is an offense directly related to the license
sought); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.020(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (requiring
that no person be denied public employment or a license “solely because of a prior conviction of a crime,
unless the crime for which convicted directly relates to the position of employment sought or the
occupation for which the license is sought” and giving guidance for determining whether there is such a
relationship); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-1-1.1-6(e) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting an
individual’s denial of a license because of a criminal conviction unless that crime is directly related to
the occupation for which the license is sought).
270
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-1-1.1-6(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
271
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-120(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). Maine has similar
provisions. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 5303 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
272
See, e.g., Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility, supra note 74, at 214–15 (“[T]he full force of a
criminal conviction is only felt and known after the most immediate consequences . . . .”).
273
Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1200 (2016).
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consequences.274 But plenty of prosecutors on the front lines might be
operating with a retributive mindset.
Many smaller jurisdictions prioritize desert in their prosecutorial
mission statements.275 Additionally, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct arguably nod to retributive principles by referencing “justice” in
the Comments to Rule 3.8, which tasks prosecutors with being “ministers of
justice.”276 While the term is undefined, what follows implies prosecutors
must be cognizant of what someone deserves: “[t]his responsibility carries
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural
justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that
special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of
innocent persons.”277 The rule itself is primarily concerned with the
adjudication of guilt in a fashion that aligns with the truth, meaning that the
“deservingness” of the defendant is front and center.
Further, the prosecutor’s role as agent for the state’s interests connects
to the retributive notion that the state is the sole legitimate punisher. In other
words, Rule 3.8’s reference to justice means the prosecutor must account for
how state action implicates justice. And when that justice necessarily entails
considerations of blameworthiness, it is hard to ignore other retributive
concepts that might serve as limits on collateral consequences felt by
defendants.
What does that reality mean for prosecutorial discretion and collateral
consequences? First, reformers should recognize that a significant number
of prosecutors might be operating from retributive premises when
approaching the bargaining process. It also means that any front-line
prosecutor who negotiates dispositions on a daily basis, and simultaneously
is cognizant of retributive principles, could also apply those principles to the
implications for collateral consequences for any given bargain. A
retributive-minded prosecutor’s focus on achieving justice cannot stop with
the disposition and immediate punishment. Assessments of blameworthiness
and proportionality made by such a prosecutor are relevant to the effect of
the plea beyond the direct sentence. This can manifest in other phases,
including how prosecutors might approach the concept of mercy,278 pardons,
or expungement.
274
One exception involves a study relating to prosecutorial perceptions of justice, although it does
not focus on punishment theory or retributivism. See Jackie Chavez & Scott Mathers, An Examination of
How District Attorneys Perceive Justice, 10 INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN. 35, 35 (2019) (focusing on
perceptions of distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice).
275
This statement is supported by research I have conducted relating to state and local prosecutor
mission statements.
276
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
277
Id.
278
Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2865 (2018).
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One example of this thought process in action is the New Jersey
Attorney General’s recent Guidance relating to marijuana prosecutions,
which calls for an individualized analysis by municipal prosecutors when
deciding how to approach low-level marijuana prosecutions.279 The
Guidance references “circumstances or factors” that should be considered
by front-line prosecutors; they include, “but are not limited to,” the type of
offense, personal characteristics of the defendant, and the adverse
consequences that may result from a conviction.280 Many of these factors
relate directly to individual blameworthiness, harm caused by the offense,
and proportionality as applied to the particular defendant. Notably, the
Guidance emphasizes several collateral consequences that might be said to
implicate the ability to participate in the community, whether those
consequences are automatically or potentially imposed by private actors.281
D. Public Criminal Records and Expungement
Every state maintains a recordkeeping system that tracks the results of
various phases of the criminal justice process. These records contain arrest,
charging, bail, pre-trial, evidentiary, bargaining, trial, and post-conviction
information.282 While the maintenance of public criminal records is not
inherently punitive, the dissemination of, and access to, such records
implicates the collateral consequences that might be labeled punishment.
States are routinely involved in either publishing the information or
regulating access,283 implicating the state’s role as the sole punisher.
The maintenance of criminal record history information has a long
history, dating back to Continental practices prior to the development of a
unique American approach.284 Its initial purposes were varied, and the
recordkeeping and dissemination of the information certainly implicates the
First Amendment.285 But the need to accurately identify recidivists was the
279
Gurbir S. Grewal, State of N.J. Office of the Attorney Gen., Guidance Regarding Municipal
Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting Marijuana and Other Criminal Offenses (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/2018-0829_AG-Memorandum.pdf (discussing various factors for
deciding whether to pursue or dismiss charges). Notably, none of these factors relate to crime control.
They are focused on the nature of the offense, blameworthiness, proportionality, and reintegration. Id.
280
Id. at 7.
281
Id.
282
For example, the average docket sheet tracks each phase through a criminal prosecution. See
L.
SCH.
LILLIAN
GOLDMAN
L.
LIBR.,
generally
Docket
Research,
YALE
https://library.law.yale.edu/guides/docket-research (last updated July 2, 2018) (describing the
information contained in a docket).
283
JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 6 (2015).
284
Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal History
Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 8–11 (2016) (outlining the “continental roots” of “modern criminal history
repositories” and describing French adoption of penal registers in 1850).
285
See, e.g., Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Expungement, Defamation, and False Light: Is What
Happened Before What Really Happened or Is There a Chance for a Second Act in America?, 49 LOY.
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primary motivation behind maintenance of criminal record history
information.286 Other goals included the prevention of future crimes,
line-drawing related to eligibility for public privileges such as voting, and
stigmatization to promote “social moralization.”287 They also were intended
to “amplify the imposed punishment and make future offending less
likely.”288 These public registries heightened the state’s capacity for
surveillance, allowing for partnership with private members of the
community.289 These goals mirror deterrence and incapacitative-based
theories.
American criminal recordkeeping began much later, and frankly
involved a mixed bag of local and state practices.290 The American
infrastructure was arguably less punitive initially, growing organically as a
means to ensure accurate reporting of governmental action.291 That aligns
with First Amendment values. A patchwork approach dominated until the
second half of the twentieth century, when the federal government began to
streamline recordkeeping practices.292 Now each state has its own criminal
record repository, with support from the federal government, which has its
own records.293 Most states maintain online databases that are largely
accessible to the public via simple online search techniques.294 Alternatively,
states publish or sell the information to private entities who then make the

U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6 (2017) (discussing the potential First Amendment implications of requiring online
publishers to post corrections or addendums for criminal records); see also Corda, supra note 284, at 13
(“[L]abor and civil liberties organizations . . . . feared that centralized and coordinated criminal history
repositories could become ‘a step towards European-style national registration systems which would
discourage the exercise of First Amendment rights.’” (quoting KENNETH C. LAUDON, DOSSIER SOCIETY:
VALUE CHOICES IN THE DESIGN OF NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 35 (1986))).
286
JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE DANGEROUS: DANGEROUSNESS, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 33–
34 (1997).
287
Corda, supra note 284, at 10 (quoting ARNOULD BONNEVILLE DE MARSANGY, EXPOSÉ
COMPLET DU SYSTÈME DES CASIERS JUDICIAIRES 648 (1848)).
288
Id. at 11 n.31 (quoting ARNOULD BONNEVILLE DE MARSANGY, EXPOSÉ COMPLET DU SYSTÈME
DES CASIERS JUDICIAIRES 665 (1848)).
289
Corda, supra note 284, at 11 (“[Penal registries] were not meant simply to be an effective
technical support for implementation of habitual offender laws. Two further goals were intended:
encouraging mutual surveillance within communities and heightening the stigma of conviction in a way
that would amplify the imposed punishment and make future offending less likely.”).
290
KENNETH C. LAUDON, DOSSIER SOCIETY: VALUE CHOICES IN THE DESIGN OF NATIONAL
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 32 (1986).
291
Corda, supra note 284, at 41 n.177 (citing SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE
REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 40 (1977)).
292
See id. at 13 (describing the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Act).
293
Corda, supra note 284, at 14.
294
For a comprehensive list of each state’s online database see Designated Statewide Criminal
History Repositories and Alternatives, NAT’L SERV., https://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/table-of-designated-state-repositories-and-alternates-2-23-2018_508.pdf (last updated Feb.
23, 2018).
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information available through background checks.295 That degree of
accessibility contrasts starkly with the period prior to the 1970s, when
criminal history information was largely invisible to the public.296
Accessibility was not synonymous with immediate availability.
Nevertheless, public criminal record history information has serious
consequences for those who encounter the system. A person’s persona and
reputation can be adversely affected, even if that person has complied with
all requirements stemming from the encounter with the criminal justice
process.297 Further, dissemination of the information can result in lost
opportunities, whether relating to education, employment, or other
privileges or benefits.298 These can amplify the effect of initial punishment
or perpetuate it.299 They also can allow the state to more easily track those
identified as dangerous.300
The traditional response to the harsh effects of criminal record history
information has been to make it less public, through sealing and
expungement remedies. These processes arose in the mid-twentieth century
and were designed to allow for offender restoration.301 They grew out of the
rehabilitative focus on punishment at the time.302 Expungement was reserved

295
JACOBS, supra note 283, at 56–58; see also Corda, supra note 284, at 6 (“The spread of the
Internet boosted access to criminal records and led to the rise of a brand new industry: private vendors
which collect criminal history information in bulk from state repositories and judicial system databases
and sell it online.”).
296
Corda, supra note 284, at 30; Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records,
Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002) (“Finding information about a person
often involved a treasure hunt around the country to a series of local offices to dig up records.”); Nancy
S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public Information,
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 441 (2009) (“[D]ocuments [could] be public, and yet because they [were]
held in different places and require[d] effort to locate, they [were], for all intents and purposes,
‘practical[ly] obscur[e].’” (citation omitted)). Notably, this historical reality—which is really a story of
inaccessibility—suggests the argument against expungement and sealing on the basis of First
Amendment access may be overblown.
297
Corda, supra note 284, at 16.
298
Id.
299
Corda, supra note 284, at 16 (quoting Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters and Recidivism:
Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 484
(2006)).
300
WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 83–84 (2009) (describing criminal history information as a way to
control “criminally risky individuals”); see also Corda, supra note 284, at 41 (“Criminal history
information is mostly seen in contemporary America as a means to control ‘dangerous bodies.’” (quoting
WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION
LAWS IN AMERICA 83–84 (2009))).
301
MARGARET LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., FORGIVING AND
FORGETTING IN AMERICAN JUSTICE: A 50-STATE GUIDE TO EXPUNGEMENT AND RESTORATION OF
RIGHTS 6 (2018).
302
Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?, supra note 278, at 2838–42 (discussing origin of
expungement statutes).
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for a small class of ex-offenders who had proved their worthiness.303 In this
respect, expungement procedure was the logical outgrowth of utilitarian
criminal purposes: the burden was on the petitioner, rather than the state, to
put an end to the punishment-like effects of a public criminal record.
Examples of such regimes existed in a number of states. State
legislatures passed expungement statutes that identified eligibility
guidelines.304 While some of these guidelines overlapped with retributive
considerations—like the gravity of the offense—many left administrative
and decision making processes ambiguous.305 Courts filled the void, creating
balancing tests that weighed state interests against those of the petitioner.306
In effect, courts were tasked with engaging in cost-benefit calculations about
offender riskiness rather than contemplating whether the individual actually
deserved to have a public criminal record after serving the initial sentence.
Retributivist principles can help counteract the stigmatization that can
result from public criminal record history information. In other words,
blameworthiness assessments and proportionality considerations are equally
applicable to the stigma that derives from the initial punishment.307 A
common objection is the notion that in a liberal, democratic society, the
operation of the criminal law must remain public. That is certainly true, but
the issue—as Dr. Alessandro Corda has asserted—is not whether such
information should be public; rather, the central concern is for “how long.”308

303
See Corda, supra note 284, at 21 (“In most states, statutes allow some ex-offenders to request
that certain convictions be sealed or expunged from their criminal history. The applicant must meet
various requirements—usually a waiting period depending on the offense, and no subsequent arrest or
conviction—and petition the sentencing court or an appellate court.” (internal citations omitted)).
304
Id.
305
See Brian Murray, Retributive Expungement, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 20–24), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3617875 (“The
considerations in the early statutes or judge-made remedies suggested a connection to rehabilitative based
logic when determining whether expungement was appropriate. In truth, some considerations—like the
nature and gravity of the offense—were not strictly utilitarian in concern. But others, such as the damage
that the petitioner has endured, the stigmatic effect of criminal record, the activities of the petitioner in
spheres of life traditionally considered the domain of the productive (work, recreation, family, etc.), led
to balancing interests.”).
306
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Penn. 1981) (adopting multi-factor test
weighing strength of Commonwealth’s case against petitioner).
307
Douglas N. Husak, “Already Punished Enough”, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 95 (1990); see also Corda,
supra note 284, at 43 (“Hard treatment and stigma represent ‘dependent components of punishment.’ . .
. the stigma component of criminal punishment should not be disproportionately imposed. While social
stigma is recognized as something an individual must deal with after being convicted of a crime,
legislatures and policy-makers cannot justly or responsibly overlook the issues of the duration and
intensity of stigma and related ramifications arising from indefinitely public [criminal conviction
records].” (quoting Douglas N. Husak, “Already Punished Enough”, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 95 (1990))).
308
Corda, supra note 284, at 44.
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And that is where a retributive conception of proportionality can be useful
in reconceiving public availability of such information.309
Permanent public criminal record availability, irrespective of the nature
of the crime, harm caused, blameworthiness, or situation of the offender
arguably ignores the retributive principles above.310 It raises severity of
punishment potentially above the desert basis related to the triggering
conviction, and especially so in the case of arrest information. As one
commentator puts it, “if the punishment ordered by the court is meant to be
commensurate or proportional to the offence, any extra hardship resulting
from stigma will distort the balance between the offence and the
punishment.”311 Once the offender has paid the debt, and received the desert,
the cause of that debt can be forgotten.312
This also comports with the restorative component underlying
retributivism: “expungement might be labeled the completion of the
retributive process because it stops the informal, and perhaps unintentional,
effects of formal punishment.”313 By preventing extra punishment,
expungement furthers the restorative components of retributivism.
In terms of expungement procedure, a desert-based approach would
shift the burden of persuasion to the state. Instead of the petitioner having to
justify elimination of the record, the state would have to justify why a public
record is a necessary component of what was deserved. Whereas existing
procedures might focus on the petitioner’s ability to demonstrate harm that
outweighs the benefits to the state from maintenance of the record, a desertbased approach would force the state to clarify why this precise information
is calibrated to the gravity of the offense and the blameworthiness of the
offender. Notably, this would all but guarantee petitioner favorable policies
for non-conviction criminal record history information, something not
ensured if crime control and public safety rationales guide decision making.
With respect to conviction information, it would require states to clearly
identify how the blameworthiness of the petitioner informs the length of time
that the record will remain public. It also would lead to more searching
309
It is important to mention that utilitarian concepts of proportionality might also be helpful here.
The costs of public stigma almost certainly render rehabilitation more difficult. Whether they have
deterrent value is probably harder to assess, but an argument could be made either way. Public criminal
record history information might not be deemed useful on incapacitative grounds if it can be shown to
be criminogenic.
310
See Corda, supra note 284, at 44 (“Allowing criminal convictions to continue to stigmatize and
haunt offenders for an indefinite time after the sentence has been fully served, irrespective of the gravity
of the underlying offense—be it a felony or a misdemeanor, a violent or nonviolent crime—makes the
overall punishment undeservedly severe.”). Of course, even if this is the case, it is an open question
whether First Amendment interests override the state obligations relating to desert.
311
NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
161 (1980).
312
Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?, supra note 278, at 2841.
313
Id.
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inquiries by judges as to the conduct underlying the conviction, especially
in cases involving guilty pleas where the charges do not seem to match the
conduct.
Interestingly, some recent expungement reforms have already gone this
route. The most progressive expungement law in the country arguably exists
in Indiana. Indiana’s statute guarantees expungement after specific periods
of time that are calibrated to the seriousness of the offense involved.314 The
length of the waiting period correlates with the gravity of the offense. In
truth, Indiana’s statute is a mix of retributive and utilitarian principles. In
addition to the waiting periods, which establish baseline eligibility
standards, petitioners also must be crime-free during that term of years.315 It
might be argued that this represents the best of both worlds: retributive
parameters with utilitarian thinking in between the lines. Without those
parameters, the utilitarian cost calculations, that can be rationalized by either
side, can lead to odd results. Those constraints are an example of retributive
principles informing expungement reform for the better, easing the road to
restoration for petitioners who otherwise would not have had a chance. The
retributive-minded constraints on the state’s ability to maintain the record
information paradoxically helps to open doors for ex-offenders.
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts a straightforward argument: retributivist principles
are a useful tool for collateral consequences reform because they lead to
suspicion that such measures go too far, inflicting punishment when it is no
longer due. The corollary is that legislatures, reformers, and other actors in
the system leave them behind at their own peril, exacerbating inequities
endemic to a collateral consequences regime permeated by incapacitative
logic. Respecting the agency and dignity of offenders, focusing on
blameworthiness and proportionality, and appreciating the sole
responsibilities of the state as punisher, suggests caution is warranted. This
has implications for several components of the system that contribute to the
existence of collateral consequences. Legislatures, prosecutors, judges, and
other decision makers who incorporate desert into their decisions must
account for these limiting principles. Furthermore, certain phases of the
system, such as the charging, bail, plea-bargaining, and expungement stages
might be reformed in light of these constraints.
This argument might seem paradoxical to some: although many
collateral consequences are understood as in-line with retributive premises,
and came to exist when retributive language reappeared in public debates
314

IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-2 to -4 (West, Westlaw through 2019 First General Session of the
121st General Assembly).
315
Id.
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about the criminal justice system, the reality is that the core premises of
almost all retributive theories should provoke skepticism about an expansive
regime of collateral consequences. Some are more useful than others given
their precise content, and many align with other restoration-minded theories
of punishment.316
In sum, the retributivist should be concerned that many collateral
consequences operate as extra punishment or punishment-like harm that
disrupts the order restored after the direct punishment. In this respect,
retributivism should not be left behind in the effort to reform collateral
consequences. Rather, it can and should partner with other important
arguments that aim towards reintegration for many offenders. It offers sharp
tools to help reformers cut many collateral consequences down to size,
helping to restore to ex-offenders what they deserve.

316
See Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 31, at 1516–18 (comparing retributivist and
reconstructionist theories of punishment).
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